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THE VALUE AND ROLE OF FOOD LABELS: THREE ESSAYS EXAMINING 
INFORMATION FLOWS IN THE FOOD SYSTEM FOR EXPERIENCE AND 
CREDENCE ATTRIBUTES 
 
This dissertation investigates the role of food labels as means of conveying 
information about food product characteristics, with particular attention to experience and 
credence attributes. Unobserved product characteristics such as taste, food safety, 
nutrition, or quality are inherently difficult to quantify but are frequent determinants of 
demand. Since not all these characteristics are measurable (e.g., food safety) or directly 
observable (e.g., nutrition), there exists information asymmetry in the market between 
firms and consumers. Product labeling is a way for information that is initially hidden to 
eventually be disseminated in the marketplace. Different labeling schemes serve different 
roles in the marketing system. For example, nutrition information is critical in 
consumption decisions, while other product characteristics (such as “organic”, or “fair 
trade”), may be valued by consumers but not essential for decision-making. 
Across three essays, we provide an assessment of how different types of labels are 
used in the food system. We focus equally on labels that have a long and rich history of 
usage in the food system (such as nutrition labels, and more recently, geographical 
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indication (GI) labeling which denote a relationship between the product origin and 
specific product characteristics), but also labels that address emerging, public-minded 
issues which may be increasingly relevant in the future (such as environmental impact 
labeling and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) labeling).  
First, we meta-analyzed the literature regarding GI valuation to generate a set of 
guidelines, independent of any particular study, outlining the factors that are instrumental 
for a GI product to capture a price premium. Our findings across many studies indicate 
that agricultural produce and minimally processed foods such as grains, fresh meats, 
fruits and vegetables, benefit the most from association with GIs. These product 
categories generally do not develop own private reputations (brands), and thus, the 
premia received from association with GI collective reputations is relatively high. On the 
other hand, in addition to GIs, products with high value-added and longer supply chains 
such as wines and olive oils may also use private brands more effectively for 
differentiation. This suggests that brands and GIs have at least a partial substitute 
relationship.  So, as the most broadly framed of the studies here, this cross-sectional 
analysis would suggest a further exploration of targeted labeling strategies, used jointly 
or independently of specific brand-name products, is warranted. 
Next, using original survey data and looking at nutrition label information, we 
find that truncated nutrition searches (looking only at the front label), or misleading 
product claims (such as “organic) are among a broad set of  reasons current nutrition 
labeling practices may be ineffective in uniformly conveying information to consumers. 
We find that a nutrition index summarizing the information on the back nutrition panel, 
coupled with the information on the front label, may help to mitigate the incomplete 
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information problems presented above. Moreover, we find that the environmental impact 
of food production is hard to identify by consumers if there is a lack of proper 
certification. But, until more consensus about key outcomes is framed by relevant 
government or consumer-oriented NGOs, a similar “informational index” solution will 
not be possible, so policy options are more limited. 
Finally, using original survey data we identify consumer preferences for CSR 
actions in the dairy industry. We find animal welfare to be the most preferred CSR 
activity and a top priority for most consumers. Sustainable agricultural practices, energy 
consumption, and waste management are second, third, and fourth, respectively, in 
importance for consumers; while company involvement in the community has the lowest 
priority amongst consumers. Furthermore, we monetize the value of animal welfare 
claims, identified as the most important CSR activity by consumers, in the context of a 
trusted third-party certification such as the Validus animal welfare certification program. 
Together, these empirical analyses provide a diverse set of findings on consumer 
perceptions, use of information, part-worth valuation of specific characteristics, as well as 
how these findings may vary by segments of consumers and product categories. By 
exploring these issues from a variety of perspectives and methods, the studies make both 
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Consumers make an average of 200 to 300 decisions regarding food consumption 
in any given day (Wansink et al., 2007). However, many product attributes, especially in 
the food industry, can be hard to assess at the moment of purchase. Whether there is 
uncertainty and imperfect information about the product characteristics, prices, or quality 
across the universe of products available, food choices are generally made in an 
incomplete informational environment. When firms have more information than 
consumers about the products in the marketplace, there is a loss of efficiency and an 
overall lower total economic surplus achieved in that market (Caswell, 1996). This lower 
surplus may be due to the lower utility achieved by consumers from transactions in the 
presence of incomplete information, an overall lower number of transactions and/or 
higher overall transaction costs. 
While information asymmetry can be manifested on a multitude of levels, this 
research focuses on information flows for experience and credence attributes at the retail 
level within the food system. Starting with Nelson (1970) and a subsequent contribution 
by Darby et al. (1973), the literature identifies three categories of product attributes 
classified depending on how easy it is for consumer to acquire information about them. 
Some product characteristics such as color or aspect are search attributes. Consumers can 
easily identify them by visiting and comparing across multiple stores. Experience 
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attributes, like taste or quality are revealed to consumers only after consumption. 
Generally, firm reputations develop as a response to the incomplete information 
associated with experience attributes (Caswell, 1996). Reputations are viewed as an 
expectation of high quality (Shapiro, 1982) when they lead to returning (as opposed to 
one-time) customers whose loyalty offers sufficient returns to incentivize investments in 
quality. The most difficult food attributes to collect information on are credence 
attributes (e.g., food safety, fair taste, or nutrition). The outcomes associated with 
credence attributes are very difficult or impossible to assess even after consumption. In 
this case, the government often chooses to play a role in making it feasible for consumers 
to assess credence-based qualities by requiring informational labeling (Caswell, 1996).  
Generally, four approaches to government labeling can be identified (Caswell et 
al., 2011). First, consumers may “need to know” specific information (such as nutrition, 
environmental sustainability, or food safety) when making purchase decisions. For 
example, disclosing nutrition facts in a standardized fashion is mandatory in North 
America because of governmental priorities related to public health. Second, information 
the public has the “right to know” is frequently regulated by mandatory or voluntary 
labeling because of popular, consumer-driven demands on policymakers. For example, 
GMO labeling (now required in Europe, but not the U.S.) is the most popular example of 
right-to-know labeling. Third, information consumers generally “want to know” about the 
products and production process (such as organic farming) is administered through 
minimum requirements that serve as the basis for voluntary labeling, and because they 
are voluntary, are more commonly used by food companies that feel they can effectively 
target consumers seeking such attributes. Fourth, product information relevant to the 
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regulatory oversight mission of “prevention of fraud” or deception of consumers is also 
subject to labeling.  
This dissertation investigates the role of food labels as means of conveying 
information about food product characteristics, with particular attention to experience and 
credence attributes. Across three essays, we provide an assessment of how different types 
of labels are used in the food system. We focus equally on labels that have a long and 
rich history in the food system (such as nutrition labels or geographical indication 
labeling, which denote a relationship between the product origin and specific product 
characteristics), but also labels that address novel, current issues and may be have a 
widespread implementation in the future (such as environmental impact labeling and 
corporate social responsibility labeling).  
In the context of government’s role in labeling, “need-to-know” labels such as 
nutrition information are implemented to correct market failures associated with credence 
nutrition information that cannot be asses even after consumption of the product. 
Nutrition labeling is mandatory in the United States; however, low rates of use are 
reported with respect to these labels (Viswanathan, 2002; Roe, 1999; Black, 1992; 
Higginson, 2002). Research shows that consumers generally do not check nutrition labels 
or use only one or two nutrition attributes (such as sugar or fat) when they do consult 
them. This results in an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the effectiveness of 
these labels in relaying information within the framework of their low use. Are nutrition 
labels accurately interpreted by consumers? Do they transmit uniform nutrition 




Similar to nutrition labels, geographical indication (GI) voluntary labels were 
implemented in the early 1990s. GIs have been successful (valued by consumers) in 
signaling a specific link (referred to as terroir) between the origin of production and 
product characteristics (Hermann et al., 2011). Prominent examples of GIs are 
Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese and Champagne wine, which are believed to be of higher 
quality, or display increased heritage connectedness. GIs are “want-to-know” labels 
signaling experience attributes that are valued by consumers, but given this designation, 
there is interest in how valued they are, particularly given that they are used in the same 
retail market environment as brand names. A very large volume of research quantifies the 
values consumers have for GI labeling for a variety of products in different regions of the 
world. However, the high variation in price premia associated with GIs raises the 
question concerning what factors drive GI valuation. Do institutional characteristics in 
each country play a role in GI valuation? Are some product categories associated with a 
higher price premium than others? This dissertation attempts to answer these questions. 
In addition to already existing labels with an established history in retail markets, 
such as nutrition and GI, current world trends and events give rise to consumer demand 
for new product information. The environmental impact of food products may qualify as 
“as “want-to-know” information. The environmental impact of food products has mostly 
been studied in the context of eco-labeling. Research finds that demand for eco-labeled 
products exists and consumers are willing to pay a price premium for more 
environmentally-friendly products (Johnston et al., 2006, Blend et al., 1999). However, in 
the lack of standardized labeling, it is hard to assess the environmental impact of food 
products. Individuals tend to develop personal norms (such as favoring product 
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packaging like cardboard, or buying organic foods) when choosing environmentally 
friendly products, and these norms are a significant predictor of their propensity to 
choose environmentally friendly options in the supermarket (Thǿgersen, 1999). This 
suggests that when credence attributes, such as the environmental impact of a product, 
are hard to assess, experience or search product attributes can be used as proxies for 
harder to assess credence attributes. However, how successful are environmental product 
cues in conveying information to consumers? Are they a substitute for standardized 
labeling? Can these cues bridge the information gap due to lack of standardized 
environmental labeling? 
Similar to environmental labeling research, research related to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) information labeling is especially relevant today given the current 
growing importance of CSR claims for consumers, producers, NGOs, and the media. 
Company CSR actions are meant to internalize negative firm externalities on society and 
the environment and work on decreasing them. The popularity of CSR initiatives have 
been increasing, however, it has been documented that only a limited number of 
consumers use it as a purchase criterion. Out of the consumers who are likely to make a 
CSR-based purchase, only a minority (21%) actually use a company’s CSR position as a 
purchase criterion (Mohr et al., 2001). The wedge between the popularity of CSR and its 
use in product selection is minimally addressed in the literature. Some of the first 
attempts to explain it call it “the paradox” of CSR in consumer behavior (Öberseder et 
al., 2011). Also, since CSR information qualifies as “want-to-know” information, it 
means that only a subset of the population may be interested in it. Identifying consumer 
preferences and values for CSR actions is part of identifying whether demand for CSR 
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information exists. Our research attempts to clarify this issue further by addressing 
unanswered questions in the literature: do consumers value CSR actions enough to pay a 
price premium for them? What are the most valued CSR actions by consumers in the 
dairy sector? Given the lack of standardized CSR information labeling, how does CSR 
information reach consumers? 
Across three essays, this dissertation attempts to provide answers to the questions 
outlined above for nutrition labeling, voluntary geographical indication certification, 
environmental impact labeling, and CSR labeling. Together, these empirical analyses 
provide a diverse set of findings on consumer perceptions, use of information, part-worth 
valuation of specific characteristics, as well as how these findings may vary by segments 
of consumers and product categories. By exploring these issues from a variety of 
perspectives and methods, the studies make both market-relevant and methodological 
contributions to the food labeling field. 
The first essay presented in Chapter II, “A Meta-Analysis of Geographical 
Indication Food Valuation Studies: What Drives the Premium for Origin Based Labels?” 
uses a  meta-analytical approach of the  empirical literature on geographical indications 
(GIs) in order to establish a link between the price premium received by the evaluated 
products and specific product, industry, or institutional characteristics. Presumed higher 
quality, specific sensory attributes, heritage production methods or other particular 
characteristics of these products (associated with the region geographical microclimate) 
are primarily experience attributes that can be evaluated through consumption (Hermann 
et al., 2011). GIs as voluntary government certifications have developed in this case to 
signal the presence of product characteristics associated with specific geographical 
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origins. The presence of GI certification is generally valued positively by consumer, but 
some types of foods may benefit from associations with GI names more than others. In 
cases where GIs coexist with other forms disclosing hidden product information (such as 
product brands), we explore the dynamics between private (brands) and collective means 
(GIs) of signaling quality for experience goods. 
Chapter III, “Exploring Product Differentiation through Environmental Impact 
Claims and Metrics”, focuses on two important characteristics of food products: nutrition 
and environmental impact. Nutrition and environmental characteristics are food credence 
attributes, whose effect cannot be immediately determined even after consumption. 
Government regulation is generally the most appropriate means of resolving information 
asymmetry problems in markets for credence attributes (Caswell, 1996). In the US, there 
is a long history of nutrition regulation culminating with the Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act (NLEA) passed by Congress in 1990 (Drichoutis et al., 2011). The NLEA 
regulates the uniform transmission of nutrition information through standardized nutrition 
facts and serving sizes on all packaged foods. However, increases in obesity rates 
(Berning et al., 2008, 2010) and reported low levels of use of information on the 
regulated product label (Higginson, 2002) suggest the need for improvement of product 
label standards or format. On the other hand, the use of rudimentary product cues (such 
as packaging material) by consumers to assess the environmental impact of food products 
(Thǿgersen, 1999) may be an indication that government intervention is this area is 
necessary. But, beyond the appropriate role of the government in labeling, this study will 
focus on how consumers currently process the information they receive in the retail 
marketplace for dairy products. 
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Chapter IV, “Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives and Consumer 
Preferences in the Dairy Industry”, investigates how information about ethical product 
claims of food can be transmitted to consumers. Ethical product claims, such as those 
featured in corporate social responsibility reports about commitments towards increased 
air quality, low energy use, or animal welfare, are credence attributes whose outcome 
cannot be immediately determined by consumers even after consumption. In this case, 
government regulation, or that from another trustworthy third-party certification program, 
is necessary to make these claims credible (Caswell, 1996, 2011). In lack of specific 
government regulations, CSR information may be communicated through indirect 
channels, such as labels instituted by the government for other purposes. For example, 
Organic product labels may be indicative of higher standard for livestock animal welfare 
in dairy products, even though organic production does not imply the adoption of the 
most rigorous animal welfare protocols held as standards by some certification programs. 
However, trusted third-party certification (such as Validus animal welfare certification) is 
also suitable, in this case, for highlighting credence attributes, but may be less commonly 
known or understood by buyers because of its relatively smaller scope in the marketplace. 
Each of the essays included in this dissertation provides an original contribution  
to the literature on information asymmetry of intrinsic product characteristics. Experience 
attributes derived from the connection with a specific geographical region are regulated 
under geographical indication voluntary schemes. The current dissertation contains the 
only meta-analysis in the literature investigating the reasons behind the premium for GI 
valuation. We use published GI valuation studies to generate a set of guidelines, 
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independent of any particular study, outlining the factors that are instrumental for a GI 
based product differentiation scheme to capture a price premium. 
 In addition to identifying the reasons behind GI valuation, we provide consumer 
valuation for product CSR credence attributes in the dairy industry. An original survey 
instrument is developed to elicit consumer preferences for CSR activities in dairy and 
value these activities in the context of current milk labels. This is the only study that we 
are aware of that identifies CSR preferences in dairy and provides a monetized value for 
them. Another contribution of this dissertation lies in measuring the information gap 
arising from lack of environmental product labeling. We use original survey data to 
statistically measure the environmental information gap by comparing it to nutrition, an 
area which currently benefits from standardized labeling. The boundaries of current 
knowledge in each of these labeling areas are identified and an original contribution is 




The Economics of Information: a Literature Review 
 
Imperfect information has profound effects upon the market structure of consumer 
goods (Nelson, 1970) and on consumer behavior in the market. The market structure may 
change, for example, when asymmetric product information leads to product 
differentiation and the creation of monopolistic competition (Wolinsky, 1984; Stiglitz, 
1979; Schultz, 2004).  
Across several disciplines like economics, psychology, sociology, social 
psychology, and anthropology, researchers have attempted to explain individual human 
choice behavior under imperfect information (Hansen, 1972). Information has economic 
value because it allows individuals to make choices that yield higher expected payoffs or 
expected utility than they would obtain from choices made in the absence of information. 
The food industry provides an especially suitable example of the effect of 
asymmetric information on markets. Many food attributes and characteristics can be hard 
to assess by consumers. Unobserved product characteristics such as taste, style or quality 
are inherently difficult to quantify but are frequent determinants of demand. In some 
markets, products may be physically similar but differ in consumers' perceptions about 
quality, durability, or status (Berry, 1994). Lancaster (1966, 1991) proposes that 
consumers are not interested in goods per se, but in their properties or characteristics. In 
Lancaster’s approach, the major food product attributes related to quality include food 
safety (e.g., levels of microbial pathogens, residues), nutrition, value (e.g., compositional 
integrity, taste), package, and process (e.g., animal welfare, environmental impact) 
attributes (Hooker et al., 1996). However, not all these characteristics are measurable 
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(e.g., food safety) or directly observable (e.g., nutrition). In other words, there exists an 
information asymmetry in the market between firms (who are more knowledgeable than 
consumers about, for example, food safety or nutrition of a product), and consumers. 
Caswell (1996) suggests that the distinction developed by Nelson (1970, 1974, 1976, 
1981) between search and experience goods, when applied to product attributes, is 
powerful in understanding how information that may be initially hidden, can be 
eventually disseminated in the marketplace.  
Nelson (1970) proposes two actions which consumers can take to assess quality 
and overall utility derived from a product: search (inspecting prior to purchasing), and 
experience (consuming the good). Search attributes (or goods) are defined by product 
attributes for which full information can be acquired prior to purchase. Clothing, 
footwear and furniture fare typically cited as examples of search goods (Seigel, 2006). 
Search attributes related to food are color, smell, and physical appearance. Experience 
goods are dominated by attributes that cannot be evaluated until purchase and 
consumption of the product. Examples of experience goods and services are automobiles, 
appliances, or weight control programs (Seigel, 2006). For food, experience attributes 
relate to taste, cooking properties, or texture of product when consumed. In 1973, Darby 
et al. added credence goods (or attributes) to this classification. Claims associated with 
credence attributes are difficult or impossible to determine even after consumption. For 
example food safety, nutrition, or ethical product claims (such as fair trade) fall into this 
category. 
Each of these types of attributes has specific information asymmetry problems in 
the market and solutions that alleviate these problems. In the market for search goods, 
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consumer information is easier to obtain. Search goods are more susceptible to 
substitution, as consumers can more easily identify and evaluate alternatives by visiting 
other outlets and stores. For food products, most search attributes (e.g., color) are not 
related to life-altering events associated to safety and nutrition so the “cost of being 
wrong” is not high (Caswell, 1996).The market for search goods has relatively minor 
regulatory activities, because consumers are in a position to provide direct incentives to 
firms to produce the search attributes that are most popular (Caswell, 1996). 
In markets for experience goods, quality information is the most important 
product characteristic (Caswell, 1996). Akerlof (1970) provides an example of market 
failure due to information asymmetry by describing the “lemon” problem in the market 
for used cars. A lack of credible quality signals creates incentives for sellers to 
misrepresent the quality of their goods. Buyer’s willingness to pay for high quality 
decreases. This creates the problem of adverse selection where high quality is crowded 
out by low quality resulting in a collapse of the market for high quality (Akerlof, 1970). 
In the market for experience goods, there exists a moral hazard problem of firms to 
misrepresent their products as high-quality and sell them to a one-time customer. One 
way firms navigate the moral hazard problem, reveal information and signal quality to 
consumers is through labeling, advertising, warranties, and building reputations.  
Reputations are costly to build and they require returning (as opposed to one-time) 
customers. Developing reputations is a good solution to alleviate information problems 
related to experience goods. 
The outcomes related to credence attributes are hard to assess by consumers even 
after consumption. Reputations rarely develop in response to credence attributes because 
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the consumer cannot learn it from his or her previous experience in consuming the 
product and cannot form a quality expectation related to a particular brand or name 
(Caswell, 1996). Reputational models of quality do not apply here, but quality signaling 
may still be used if it involves a third-party reputable certification agent whom 
consumers trust (Caswell, 1996). The government can play a role in increasing the 
number of informed consumers by facilitating communication through official and 
consistent labeling and certification. Labeling changes the amount or type of information 
that is available in the market and has the advantage to certify the effect of individual 
product attributes (the Lancasterian approach) as opposed to entire goods and services 
(Caswell et al., 2011).  
While information asymmetry is an important factor affecting consumer product 
selection and the product purchasing process, consumers’ tastes and preferences also 
affect market behavior. Individual preferences determine the relative importance given by 
each consumer to various product attributes, and different consumers make different 
choices based on their unique preference map. Consumer purchase behavior (buying a 
specific product when other substitutes are available) can be used to infer what product 
attributes consumers value (revealed preferences) and what their underlying preferences 
are (McFadden, 2001). However, while consumer choices for market goods can change 
based on the situation surrounding the decision-making process (Fishhoff, 1993), it has 
been shown that people’s values are more stable (Lusk et al., 2005). Values are defined as 
meta-preferences (Lusk et al., 2005), or “underlying preferences” (Becker, 1976) that 
people hold with respect to the essential aspects of human life. The desire to have a 
healthy lifestyle, be compassionate towards others, respect the environment, or achieve 
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fame and prestige are some of these values (Lusk et al., 2005). These values motivate the 
choice of products individuals make more so than individual preferences over a set of 
attributes, which can be circumstantial and contextual. Also, while consumers may not 
have specific preferences for individual product characteristics, they do hold underlying 
values that help them make decisions. For example, while people may not have specific 
preferences for vitamin A relative to vitamin B12 content of a specific food, they are 
likely to know whether “nutrition”, as a value, is important for them and make choice that 
support outcomes that are nutrition-friendly (Lusk et al., 2005). The means-end chain 
literature pioneered by Gutman (1982) upholds the idea that goods are the means 
(objects, or activities) in which people engage in order to achieve desired end-states such 
as “happiness, security, or accomplishment”. These recent developments of consumer 
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 A Meta-Analysis of Geographical Indication Food Valuation Studies:  




Agricultural and food products have long been associated with unique 
characteristics and heritage aspects associated with their origin. Geographical names have 
been used since classical times to identify products of exceptional quality; for example, 
historical documents reveal the notoriety of olive oils from Baetica in Rome (Blasquez et 
al., 1992). Through the ages, a number of products identified by their origins emerged 
and, more recently, have established a niche in food and beverage markets. Well-known 
examples of Geographical Indications (GIs) are the wines of Bordeaux and Porto, the 
cheeses of Parma and Rochefort, and the hams from Parma and Bayonne. In general, the 
association of food products and geographic names identifies distinct agro-ecological 
conditions, typically raised animal breeds and plant varieties, and human capital uniquely 
suited to the region. These conditions are often associated with the definition of terroir 
(Joslin, 2006). In addition, the names of GI products may signal specific modes of 




In an increasingly industrialized and standardized food market, GI labels seem to 
suggest consumers a more genuine, unique and higher quality food (Broude, 2005); while 
offering producers an opportunity to differentiate their products and, perhaps, obtain 
higher prices. Thus, firms may use a GI to signal intrinsic quality attributes to consumers, 
and thus, capture a reputation rent (Menapace et al., 2011). A measure of a GI label’s 
success might, then, be partially evaluated by the price differential between a GI product 
and its branded or commodity competitors in the market. Based on this criterion, and 
using the empirical literature documenting how GI products’ valuations measure up 
relative to commodities in the same product category, it is possible to identify which food 
categories have secured higher premia. To this end, we compiled a pool of 25 empirical 
studies analyzing GI labels and observed that the statistical and economic significance of 
estimated price differentials vary substantially. Using these studies we aim to provide 
preliminary answers to the following questions: what critical factors determine price 
premiums? Do these factors vary across products and countries? When do GIs add more 
value to products than alternative differentiation strategies?  
Food producers, namely those producing processed products, such as cheeses or 
wines, have, and use, alternative marketing strategies to differentiate their products based 
on individual reputations. In fact, there is a wide variety of products in the food and 
beverage sectors that have achieved widespread recognition and popularity using brand 
names rather than geographic designations. Thus in some product categories there may 
co-exist GIs and branded products (or trademarks). While indications of origin have 
mainly been used in Southern European countries, they are becoming increasingly 
common in Northern Europe, the New World and in developing countries. Examples 
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include wines from specific viticultural areas in North America, Australia and New 
Zealand; Jamaica’s Rum and Blue Mountain coffee, as well as India’s Basmati rice and 
Darjeeling tea (Costanigro et al., 2009; Schamel et al., 2006; Das 2006; Gautam et al., 
2010; Deppeler et al. 2011).  
To the best of our knowledge there is no previous study attempting to compare GI 
price premiums across product categories. Still such information could help both 
producers and policy makers decide in which cases the labeling of origin might be 
suitable marketing instrument. A suitable methodology to compile and investigate 
common patterns in the published work is meta-analysis regression. This technique is 
quite common in the medical science to establish common patterns in related studies and 
reconcile possible conflicting evidence (Hunt, 1997). It is also increasingly used in 
economics to perform “a more formal and objective process of reviewing an empirical 
literature” (Stanley, 2001, pp. 147-148).  Our intent is to generate a set of guidelines, 
independent of any particular study, outlining the factors that are instrumental for a GI 
based product differentiation scheme to capture a price premium. 
More specifically, the primary objective of this study is to (meta-) analyze the 
empirical literature on GIs in order to establish a link between the GI premium and 
specific product, market characteristics and/or institutions. We consider three major 
dimensions of each product examined: 1) broad food categories, degree of food 
processing and product prices; 2) existence/absence of an alternative differentiation 
mechanism (i.e. branding) and; 3) the institutions and laws regulating the use of GIs. We 
proceed by summarizing the relevant literature on why consumers and producers may 
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value GI labels, describing the data and methodology employed here, presenting the 





Economists suggest that GIs are used in food markets to signal intrinsic qualities 
of foods that consumers attribute to certain origins (Menapace et al., 2011). Indeed, 
Costanigro et al (2010) emphasize how GIs may essentially provide a means to broadly 
categorize food choices, thereby facilitating consumer learning and the articulation of 
quality expectations (a reputation effect). 
However, the reasons behind consumers’ and producers’ use of GIs are likely to 
be complex and multi-faceted. Scarpa et al (2005) suggest one potential rationale, arguing 
that consumers’ ethnocentric preferences or home bias may explain some of the 
preferences for origin labeled foods. In other words, the argument is that consumers tend 
to prefer products from the region or country with which they identify. Another reason, 
suggested by Broude (2005), is that GIs may counteract the perception that increased 
globalization has led to overly standardized food choices imposed by international 
brands. Still another argument is that GIs reveal and represent some sort of authenticity, 
cultural heritage or the ability to trace food choices to their origin (Herrman et al., 2010). 
In short, there seems to be a renewed interest by some segment of consumers in 
“authentic,” “traditional,” “wholesome,” and “traceable” food which seems related to a 
range of factors such as increased awareness of food safety, the socio-cultural status of 
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consuming certain foods and renewed interest in, or nostalgia of, one’s culinary heritage 
(Ilberry et al., 2000).  
Farmers may use GI designation to differentiate their products and avoid 
competition in commodity markets, where brand-based product differentiation is 
otherwise impractical. That is, farmers and primary food processors using GI labels may 
have easier or cost effective access to niche markets, and have the ability to extract 
premium prices (Bramley et al., 2009). A theoretical framework explaining the use of GIs 
and trademarks has been proposed by Menapace et al, (2011), extending an earlier model 
from Shapiro (1983) on the relationship between minimum quality standards, reputation, 
and price premia. In both articles, premia for high quality are modeled as (lagged) returns 
from investment in quality.  Since reputations develop slowly over time, a price premium 
(above cost of production) is necessary to induce firms to produce at any quality level 
above the minimum standard imposed on all firms. The farther away a firm moves from 
the minimum standard in the quality spectrum, the longer it will take to build the 
reputation, the larger the premium needs to be. Thus, for producers with limited resources 
who are located in a GI area, it may be a sensible strategy to use the origin labels rather 
than to develop their own reputation through a brand. 
 
Along these lines, policy-makers have long acknowledged consumer interest and 
the potential of GIs to impact product valuation, international trade flows and farm policy 
(Herrmann et al., 2010). Most importantly, GIs may represent a key option to raise 
farmers’ incomes and promote rural development (Josling, 2006). After a long period of 
spontaneous and informal development, designations of origin have been the object of 
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increasing policy and regulatory efforts, most notably in Europe.  In the early 1990’s, the 
European Union conferred legal protection to foods and foodstuffs with a GI through 
Regulation (EEC) 2081/92 (EEC Council, 1992). At the core of this regulation is the idea 
that products originating from certain regions are sui generis, in that there is a direct link 
that can be demonstrated between the product origin and its final quality (Herrmann et 
al., 2010). This link occurs either via a set of standardized processing practices typical of 
a region or by the concept of terroir. The varying strength of this link is the rationale 
behind the use of two labels: in the case of a PGI, either production, processing or 
preparation of a product need to occur in the geographical area; while for a PDO all 
stages must occur in the same region (O’Connor, 2007).  In other words, PDOs have 
more stringent standards of production and signal a stronger link between origin and the 
product’s attributes. Finally, this regulation confers protection from “abusive” or 
unwarranted use of a protected designation of origin (PDO) or a Protected Geographical 
indication (PGI). 
While the EU legislation on GIs is perhaps the most fully articulated and 
comprehensive (Josling, 2006), other countries have their own systems. In the US, GIs 
are protected within the standard trademark system, and most often simply verify the 
geographical origin of a product (Menapace et al., 2009). Names or signs, which 
otherwise would be considered primarily geographically descriptive, can be registered as 
quality assurance programs (USPTO, 2011). The process of establishing and using such a 
verification process is straightforward. First, an agency (at the state or regional level) 
establishes the standards governing a GI based trademark (e.g.: Idaho Potatoes must be 
grown in Idaho, and must be of a specific variety, e.g. Burbank, see O’Connor, 2007). It 
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is up to the agency to choose how strict these standards are based on their perceptions of 
the existence of differentiation opportunities in the marketplace. Then, anyone who meets 
these standards is permitted to use the geographical name to market their product. In the 
case of GIs, the geographical origin is usually the main attribute that is regulated by the 
quality assurance program or trademark (USPTO, 2007). However, the allowance of 
multiple criteria suggests that trademark programs may display a weaker link between 
origin and product attributes than the PGI and the PDOs, and instead, require a broad set 
of practices to truly differentiate the product in the consumer’s eyes. 
In short, both food producers and consumers seem to benefit from the use of GI 
labels. From a producer’s perspective, origin can be an inexpensive way to differentiate a 
product and obtain a price premium. For consumers, it is a way to reduce search costs, as 
GI can incorporate a heuristic with which consumers limit the number of options on a 
choice set for a product category of interest (Costanigro et al., 2010). When origin is a 
valuable attribute, there will be a strong incentive to free ride. Consequently consumers 
may distrust the origin label unless there is some form of assurance that the product they 
face is genuine. This is why some origin labels, notably those regulated and recognized 
by the EU, have a standard, third-party monitoring and certification scheme to which all 








3. Methodology and Data Description 
 
As already mentioned, this research employs a meta-analysis to determine what 
factors influence the variation of price premium across products using GI labels. This 
methodology is increasingly popular in economics and recent examples of its application 
include Lusk et al (2005) on the valuation of genetically modified foods; Brander et al, 
(2011), on the value of urban open space; and Lagerkvist et al, (2011), on consumer 
willingness to pay for animal welfare.   
The meta-analysis methodology entails to quantitatively analyze the results of 
empirical studies that investigate the same topic. This is a popular analysis in social 
studies, medical and clinical research, and psychology (Hedges et al., 1998). The 
objective of meta-analyses is to provide an overview of the research on a particular topic 
by summarizing and synthesizing the results in the field, as well as testing theoretical and 
practical hypotheses that cannot be tested in the primary research (Brannick et al., 2008).  
Generally, this is accomplished by estimating the mean of the distribution of effect sizes 
(coefficient estimates) from multiple studies, and estimating and explaining the variance 
in the distribution of these coefficient estimates (Brannick et al., 2008). Examining the 
variance in coefficient estimates explains how study characteristics affect research results 
and helps draw overarching relevant conclusions about the topic of study. 
Some advantages and disadvantages of meta-analyses emerge when compared to 
traditional literature reviews. One advantage is that, while traditional literature reviews 
may only selectively include studies based on the reviewer’s own subjective view of the 
quality of the study, meta-analyses include studies based on clearly defined rules and thus 
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are less biased (Wolf, 1986). In addition, the subjective weighting of studies or the failure 
to examine study characteristics as explanations of results across studies are addresses in 
meta-analyses compared to traditional literature reviews (Wolf, 1986). On the other hand, 
one of the main criticisms of meta-analyses is that it includes published research that is 
biased in favor of significant findings because insignificant findings are rarely published 
(Rosenberger et al., 2009; Wolf, 1986). However, this is also the pitfall of traditional 
literature reviews, since publication bias affects both.  
Statistical issues arise when analyzing data compiled from numerous studies that 
use different methods to generate their own estimates. Some of the ways biased 
conclusions may be obtained in meta-analyses include a strong bias towards publishing 
positive but not negative results (Rosenthal, 1979), weighing equally the results of all 
studies even through there may be qualitative differences among them, or including 
multiple results from a single study. This latter problem of within-study correlation of 
estimates is one of the main analytical criticisms of meta-analyses. Two statistical models 
have been historically used to examine this type of data: fixed-effects and random-effects 
models (Hedges et al., 1998; National Research Council, 1992). In the fixed-effects 
model, it is assumed that the underlying effect of each study is the same. The variation in 
investigated outcome will therefore reflect only the random variation within each study 
but not any potential heterogeneity across studies (Schulze et al., eds., 2003). Random-
effect models have been used to account for within-study correlation of estimates (Lusk 
et al, 2009). The random effects model incorporates variation between the models. It is 
assumes that each study has its own effect.  
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In other words, if there is reason to believe that the effect sizes are homogeneous 
in nature and the researcher wishes to make inferences only about the parameters in the 
set of studies that are observed, then fixed effects model is appropriate. In contrast, if 
estimates are not homogeneous and inferences need to be generalized beyond the 
observed studies, random effects model can be used (Hedges et al., 1998). Recently, 
however, meta-analysis studies test for the existence of fixed or random effects and may 
choose neither (Lusk et al, 2009; Ehmke, 2006). In these cases, a simple OLS model may 
be appropriate. It can also be argued that not all studies synthesized in a meta-analysis 
should be given equal weight (Wolf, 1986). Some studies may be based on very small or 
unrepresentative samples of subjects. Assigning equal weights may lead to less 
representative studies contributing equally to results as more well-designed studies 
(Wolf, 1986). Using the sample size as weight gives higher weights to studies that 
provide “more evidence” and more precise parameter estimates (Schulze et al., 2003). 
Most meta-analysis methodologies originate from the psychology literature, 
where most meta-analyses are done. While psychology data may be different than, for 
example, economics data, the general rules and framework developed in psychology also 
applies to social sciences studies. While the debate about the usefulness of meta-analyses 
is on-going (Hunter et al., 1996; Feinstein, 1995), it a useful tool frequently adopted by 
researchers (Schulze et al., eds., 2003). Meta-analysis is not a strictly standardized 
technique and criticisms originate not only on statistical grounds but also on conceptual 
and philosophical grounds (Schulze et al., eds., 2003). However, the technique is helpful 
in highlighting gaps in the literature and providing insights into new directions for 
research (Wolf, 1986). 
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In order to compile the database used in this study, we searched several applied 
economic and food industry databases for studies estimating consumers’ willingness to 
pay (WTP) or market premium for GIs in a variety of food products. More specifically, 
EconLit, Web of Science, EBSCO Business Source Premier, and Google Scholar were 
consulted in early 2011. Studies published after this date or in other databases may not be 
included. Since the first transnational regulation on GI products was introduced in the EU 
in 1992, we only included studies dated from 1990 onwards. To identify relevant studies 
we used the following keywords and keyword combinations: “geographical indication”, 
“protected designation origin”, “protected geographical indication”, “PDO”, “PGI”, 
“trademark”, “WTP label”. To be included in the sample, the studies had to meet two 
general criteria: 1) GI valuation estimates were reported as a premium/discount with 
respect to a generic, non-GI, product, and, 2) the product has a strong geographical 
connotation, identifying a specific region of production. 
To be precise, the first criterion implied including only articles for which it was 
possible to obtain valuation estimates (either directly or as a function of the reported 
estimates) calculated with respect to a generic (non-GI) reference product or a 
superordinal product categorization
1
 (for example, Bordeaux wine valued with respect to 
a pool of other European wines, or other French wines). As for the second criterion, all 
estimates relative to products carrying a PDO, PGI, or trademarked geographical label 
were included, as well as products originating from a very specific region that may not 
have an official GI label (e.g. wine from Hunter Valley, Australia). Studies estimating 
consumer valuation of country of origin labels (COOL) were excluded from the sample 
                                                 
1
 Examples of GIs studies excluded under this criterion include Mtimet, 2006; Santos, 2005; Schamel, 




because the link between geographic name and specific growing conditions (the concept 
of terroir) was considered too weak. That is, a WTP differential for similar food products 
made in U.S. vs. made in China might have more to do with perceived differences in food 
safety standards than differences in growing conditions. Finally, we did not consider 
studies estimating the premium for locally-grown products, as products marketed as 
“local” rarely identify specific enough characteristics of the region of production.  For 
local products, the geographic connotation relates more to the distance (rather than 
product origin) between location of production and the location of consumption, and is 
therefore a relative concept. In short, what is perceived as local by a New York consumer 
is certainly not local for a San Francisco one, and vice-versa.  
In total, 25 studies were identified and relevant information was compiled in a 
dataset for further analysis. These studies often report estimates for more than one GI, 
leading to a total sample size of 141 product-specific estimates. The sample was adjusted 
to exclude extreme outliers, yielding a final sample size of 134 observations collected 
from 22 papers. Table 2.1 lists each study, the food product involved, the broadly defined 
methodological approach of each study, as well as the number of GI estimates collected.  
 
(See Table 2.1) 
 
As in other meta-analysis studies involving valuation of labeled attributes 
(Ehmke, 2006; Lusk et al., 2005), estimates of the GI premia were normalized across 
articles as the percentage price (or valuation) difference between labeled and unlabeled 




Price of GI Product- Price of Reference Product
% Premium= *100






This specification normalizes the estimates across the different years, units of 
measure (i.e., kilograms, pounds, cc, etc) and currencies reported. 
It should be noted that several challenges emerged in compiling the data.  In a 
study using an experimental design where a reference price was not given, (Groot et al., 
2009), the median of the price treatments is used as reference price (following Lusk et al., 
2005). Furthermore, many studies (more than 30% of our sample) reported only point 
estimates, and not the associated standard errors.  Even for the cases in which some 
measure of the precision of the estimates was provided, we found them to be extremely 
heterogeneous
2
.  Another limiting data issue regarded the demographics of the sample, 
and particularly income, which were either missing or reported inconsistently across 
studies (for example, “high” vs. “low” income instead of income categories or levels)
3
. 
While we acknowledge these limitations, the compiled dataset contains a wealth 
of information that does allow for some useful comparisons and analysis including: 
location and period covered by the study, type of GI scheme (PDO, PGI, GI-based 
trademarks or generic geographical references), sample size and type of data used in the 
original study (i.e. survey, experiment, scanner data, etc), and methodology used to 
                                                 
2
 The metrics used included standard errors, t-statistics, exact p-values or cutoff p-values (e.g., 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.1). While all these measurements could be transformed into a uniform variable, for 44 out of a total 
of 141 observations (31.2% of our sample size) no measurement of precision of the WTP estimate was 
reported.   
3
 Income was considered an important variable a priori since studies that include a larger proportion of 
more affluent consumers may have inflated willingness to pay estimates. 
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estimate the price premium (hedonic methods, contingent valuation, other)
4
. The 
valuation estimates were also categorized by broad food classes (cheese, meat, fruit, etc) 
and three super-categories based on the level of processing that the base agricultural 
commodity underwent (highly processed for cheese and wine; low/intermediate for olive 
oil, grain, coffee, meat; and fresh produce for fruits and vegetables). A final 
categorization was based on the perceived propensity for firm branding within each 
product market, which we consider as another important product differentiation 
mechanism.  Wine and olive oil where characterized as markets in which brands are 
almost always present, while cheese and meat both may be branded or generic, and at 
least in this time frame, branding was more rare for grain, fresh fruits and vegetables.  A 
description of the variables and their descriptive statistics is provided in Table 2.2. 
 
(See Table 2.2) 
 
The percentage premium for all GIs varies widely from a minimum of -36.73% 
for Provolone Valpadana Cheese (Galli, 2010) to +181.92% for Valle d’Aosta Fromadzo 
Cheese in Italy (Galli, 2010). The average percentage premium for GIs is 15.12% once 
extreme outliers
5
 were removed. While the mean WTP is positive, indicating that 
consumers are generally willing to pay more for GI products, there is a great deal of 
variability in the reported premia(a estimated standard deviation of 35.5%). It should be 
                                                 
3 
Methodologies coded as “other” include simple reporting of a price differential between the labeled 
product and an unlabeled substitute (Galli et al.), auctions/ bids (Stefani, 2005; Akaichi et al., 2009), 
random utility models (Botonaki et al., 2004), and contingent valuation methods (Skuras et al, 2002).  
5
To reduce the effect of extreme (and perhaps suspicious) observations on our estimates, we eliminated 7 
observations falling outside a  +/- 2 standard deviations from the mean estimated percentage premium. (see 
Table 2.1 for excluded studies). One std.dev. in this sample is 38% and the mean is 21.3%, so estimates 
outside the -54% and +94% range were excluded. 
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also noted that the majority of studies in this sample (55%) are based on valuations by 
European consumers, followed by North and Central American studies (31%) and, 
finally, Australian and New Zealand studies (14%).  
Figure 2.3 shows the broad product categories represented in our sample by the 
GI scheme (PDO, PGI, or trademark).   
 
(See Figure 2.3) 
 
From a statistical viewpoint, it would be ideal to have all product categories 
represented within each GI-based quality assurance scheme, with similar frequencies.  
Instead, PDO-protected products are mostly cheese, followed by wine, olive oil, fruits 
and vegetables, and meat.  The majority of PGI certified products in our sample are 
meats, followed by grains and olive oil; while GI trademarks are mostly used with wine 
products
6
 (73%), and fruits and vegetables, such as Washington apples and Idaho 
potatoes.  Comparing PDO and PGI product lists, it appears that, with the exception of 
fresh produce, the more processed products such as cheese, wine, and olive oil self-select 
into the more complex PDO quality assurance, while the less processed meats and grain 





                                                 
6
 Wines are coded as trademarks when the original study specifies that they are produced in a specific 
American Viticultural Area (AVA) 
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4. Model and Estimation Methods 
 
The main advantage of meta-regression analysis is the ability to describe the 
variation existing in the selected studies (Stanley 2001), but there are still several options 
for model specification which depend on priors about what variables may explain the 
variation. 
We estimate three model specifications, the most descriptive of which (Model 1) 
takes the form: 
(1)
 
           
     
     
ij 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i
1 i 2 i 3 i
1 j 2 j 3 j ij
%Premium = α +α Wine +α Cheese +α Meat +α Grain +α OliveOil +α FruitVeggie
+β PDO + β PGI + β CertMark +




%Premium indicates the i
th
 estimated premium from the j
th
 study.  Thus, the 
general modeling framework assumes that the percentage WTP/price premium for GI 
certified food products depends on product/market specific characteristics (as captured by 
the alpha coefficients), the quality assurance scheme (beta coefficients), and a series of 
study-specific controls (gamma coefficients) accounting for the data and methods used in 
each original study. The reference categories for each set of dummy variables are 
respectively coffee, unregulated regional designations of origin, and studies using 
methods “other” than conjoint and hedonic analyses. 
 Model 2 and 3 aim to abstract from specific product categories and investigate 
general product and market characteristics which may explain variations in GI premia. In 
Model 2 we replace the product category dummies with variables quantifying the level of 




(2)       ...ij 0 1 i 2 i 1 i ijPremium = α +α HighlyProcessed +α Fresh Produce + β PDO    
 
In Model 3 we focus on the degree of firm branding observed for each product:  
 
(3)       ...ij 0 1 i 2 i 1 i ijPremium = α +α FullBrand +α MixedBrand + β PDO    
 
Admittedly, these two ”umbrella” categories are somewhat collinear, as longer 
supply chains seem to be typical of markets in which brand names have developed. 
As it was not possible to directly include reliable measures of the variance of the 
estimates in our meta-analysis, our approach was to designate statistically insignificant 
estimates as zero. For the remaining estimates, we follow the approach of Lusk et al 
(2005) and use the sample size of the original study as a measure of precision. The 
argument is that, as long as a study employed a consistent estimator, we expect the 
variance to decrease as the sample size increases.  Thus, all three models are first 
estimated via ordinary least squares and then by weighted least squares, where the 
weights are proportional to the sample size of each study. This implies that estimates of 
GI premia generated from a larger sample size will have a greater effect on our estimated 
coefficients than estimates coming from a smaller sample.  
Regarding the error term of our model, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
residuals are uncorrelated across studies, but some degree of correlation should be 
expected when premium estimates are obtained from the same study.  As a cautionary 





Random and fixed effect (panel) models were also estimated. For the 
fixed effects model, the null hypothesis that all fixed effects are jointly equal to zero 
cannot be rejected with a joint F-stat (prob>F=0.943). For the random effects model, the 
null hypothesis that within-study variances are zero, tested with the Breusch-Pagan LM 
Test, cannot be rejected (prob>Chi
2
=0.218). This suggests that the weighted OLS 





Estimation results are reported in Table 2.4. Both un-weighted and weighted 
results are provided for Model 1, while Model 2 and 3 are presented only in the weighted 
version. As a robustness check, Model 1 was also estimated (via WLS) using only the 
data from Europe-based studies.  For Model 1, the weighted model is superior to the un-
weighted model in that it provides more precise estimates (lower standard errors), and 
overall model fit (R-squared increases from 0.241 to 0.666).  Thus, we focus the 
discussion on the results estimated via WLS. 
 
(See Table 2.4) 
 
 The first notable result is that GI labeling for grain, meat and fresh produce 
commands the highest price premium, 121.5%, 72% and 64%, respectively. Cheese 
follows with a percentage increase in premium of 43.5%. In contrast, the lowest 
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percentage price increase for GI labeling are associated with olive oil and wine, with 31% 
and 21.5% premia, respectively. All these estimates are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. It should be noted that, as average prices are quite different across product 
categories, this ranking of premia may change if they are considered in absolute monetary 
terms. However, we find the percentage representation preferable as it normalizes for 
differences in cost of production and added value. When only European studies are used 
in the estimation, the magnitude of the premia changes (and statistical significance is lost 
because of the smaller sample size), but the ordinal ranking is generally preserved (see 
Figure 2.5). 
 
(See Figure 2.5) 
 
Controlling for product-specific differences, a European product with a PDO 
certification commands a price premium 21% higher than one using a non-regulated 
regional name. In short, the PDO percentage premium is higher than the average PGI 
value, which aligns with our expectations, considering that the PDO certification process 
is more complex and requires a stronger connection between raw materials, stages of 
production, final product characteristics and the geographical area of production.  While 
this ordinal ranking in premium for PDO and PGI certifications appears clear, little more 
can be said regarding the magnitude of the PGI premium since Table 2.3, shows that the 
point estimate for PGI certification is imprecise, with very large standard errors, weak 
significance and changing signs. 
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In the US, the presence of a GI trademark is associated with an even higher price 
premium than the PDO, 39%. This finding is worthy of further discussion given that the 
process surrounding these designations is relatively unregulated, which would suggest 
weaker quality assurance. Moreover, in terms of methodology, valuation methods such as 
conjoint analyses and hedonic models tend to generate higher premia estimates than the 
reference group of “other” methods, by an average of 54% and 64%, respectively. 
Results from Model 2 suggest that the categorization by level of processing is not 
informative with respect to cross-product differences in price premia observed in Model 
1. GIs in fresh produce provide the largest premium (27.8%), but the processing intercept 
shifters have weak significance and most of the product-specific premia seem to transfer 
to the PDO and PGI estimates, which increase to 30.7% and 10%, respectively.  Model 3 
is slightly superior in fit (see adjusted R
2
) to Model 2, and produces results that are more 
consistent with those obtained with the more product-driven Model 1. According to 
Model 3, the GI premium for fully branded products (wine and olive oil) is 34.5% lower 
than products not generally carrying a private label. Products that sometimes display 
brand names (meats, cheeses) also register a decrease in their price premium, albeit a 











Findings from this study may provide an interesting survey of the field’s 
understanding of location-based price dynamics.  Based on a meat-analysis, GIs 
constitute an effective differentiation instrument in food markets.  However, the 
magnitude of the price premium associated with GIs varies rather significantly across 
products.  Comparing high (percent) premium (grain, meats, fruits, vegetables and 
produce) and low premium products (wine, olive oil, cheese), a set of key differentiating 
characteristics emerge.   
 
(See Table 2.6) 
 
The prevalence of high GI premia seem to correspond to minimally processed 
foods with short supply chains, and a large number of atomistic, undifferentiated 
producers.  In contrast, price premia are smaller when the products are processed, the 
supply chain is long and the firm brands are known to consumers. This result is in line 
with the theoretical prediction of Menapace and Moschini (2011) and Costanigro et al 
(2010).  
 Given the nature and collinearity of the existing literature’s valuation studies 
(which is the data available for analysis), it is hard to determine which factor is the most 
critical in triggering some pricing power for affiliated agriculture and food producers.  
However, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the extent and importance of 
firm branding is one of the most important factors.  Indeed, the inversely proportional 
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relationship between the presence of firm branding in a product category and the price 
premium that GIs can capture is quite evident (see Figure 2.5), and robust to the type of 
consumers (rest of the world vs. European only).  
An interpretative framework for this finding is provided by Costanigro et al 
(2010) who found that, at parity of quality, shifting from cheap to expensive wines 
induces reputation premia to migrate from collective names (viticultural areas) to brand 
names (specific wineries).  When interpreting this finding, one must consider the 
economic tenet of search costs: when buying cheap products (such as grains, fruits and 
vegetables), it may not be worth it for the consumer to critically differentiate across many 
individual producers.  GIs are therefore the main product differentiation tool because they 
provide a simple categorization of the available choices. When purchasing more 
expensive products (such as wine and olive oil), the incentive to learn about differences 
in quality across brand names is more pronounced.  Indeed, the quality of individual 
firms is likely more consistent than the quality of groups of producers, and therefore, firm 
reputations provide a better assurance of quality and consistency than GIs. 
 This reasoning does not necessarily imply that GIs have little use in markets for 
expensive food products. As a matter of fact, the ubiquitous presence of denominations of 
origin in wine and cheese (see Figure 2.3) is a proof to the contrary.  A possibility is that, 
for expensive food products, consumers may use GIs to narrow down the large choice set 
of competing firms to a specific group(s) of producers for which learning about 
individual firm differences is worth the time. Then, consumers can investigate the subset 
of selected brands (identified by the GI) more thoroughly, or invest in directly 
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experiencing a specific product.  This hypothesis is worthy of future investigation, as it is 
not testable given the summary nature of the current analysis. 
 The institutional framework regulating GIs and its effect on price premium is 
interesting to consider given its implications for marketing policies. In Europe, more 
stringent regulations for the PDO appear to secure a higher price premium than its less 
cogent quality assurance counterpart (PGI). Stricter regulations may signal increased 
benefits to consumers in the form of food safety, quality assurance, stronger cultural/ 
heritage connection, etc., prompting a higher willingness to pay for products that are 
more closely regulated. 
It is therefore surprising that the GI trademarks in the United States, representing 
a less stringent accreditation process than the PDO or PGI, command a premium (39%) 
higher than both the PGI and PDO.  Even though the results is robust to alternative 
econometric specifications of the model (see Table 2.4), one caveat is that the product 
classes carrying PDO or PGI labels are much more heterogeneous than what we report 
for trademarks.  Also, country-specific factors and sample demographic controls which 
could not be controlled for in the model (especially sample income), may make GI 
estimates across such diverse countries not directly comparable. 
In summary, our work confirms the work of Shapiro (1983) and Menapace and 
Moschini (2012) regarding the relationship between minimum quality standards, 
reputation price premia, and use of GI labels. In both articles, premia for high quality are 
modeled as (lagged) returns from investment in quality (see Figure 2.7).   
 




Since reputations develop slowly over time, a price premium (above cost of 
production) is necessary to induce firms to produce at any quality level above the 
minimum standard imposed on all firms ( 1
0q  in Figure 2.7, upper panel). The farther away 
a firm moves from the minimum standard in the quality spectrum, the longer it will take 
to build the reputation, and the larger the premium needs to be to work as an incentive for 
producing higher quality.  
The economic rationale for the lower reputation premium is that the presence of 
an additional label shortens the lag between producing at high quality and developing a 
corresponding reputation. In short, GI labels would benefit consumers by lowering the 
reputation costs for buying high quality food products. 
 
 
7. Conclusions and future research 
 
Agricultural and food products have long been associated with unique quality 
attributes strongly associated with the agro-ecological characteristics and culinary 
traditions of their origin. GIs formalize this connection in the marketplace, typically 
leading to positive price premia. In this study, we investigate this market dynamic further 
by analyzing how price premia for GIs vary by product, regional designation, and 
intrinsic product characteristics. In terms of percentage price premium, agricultural 
produce and minimally processed foods benefit the most from GI differentiation.  We 
interpret this finding in light of the fact that, in addition to GIs, products with valued 
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added characteristics and longer supply chains may use private brands to capture 
reputation premia. In other words, brands and GIs may play a similar role in product 
differentiation, and thus, be substitutes for each other.  
The institutional framework for the GI was found to matter: within the same 
country, quality assurance schemes with higher quality standards such as the PDO 
receive a higher premium than less stringent ones (PGI). Moreover, when multiple 
labeling schemes with different minimum quality standard coexist (as for PDOs and PGIs 
in Europe), the price premium associated with the labels is lower than when a single label 
is used (as for the GI trademark in the US).  Our interpretation is that reputations for high 
quality are easier to achieve (and thereby less costly for the consumer) when multiple 
quality assurance schemes segment the quality spectrum. 
This analysis identified a number of possibilities for future research both from a 
consumer’s and producer’s perspective. As mentioned above, consumers may be using a 
GI label to narrow the set of choices when searching for certain (branded) types of food. 
We envision using experimental methods to test this hypothesis, varying the labels across 
products and labeling options. This may even provide information to retailers who 
continue to fine-tune their sourcing and point-of-purchase strategies in efforts to maintain 
market share among an increasingly diverse set of customers that seek attributes aligned 
to their specific preferences. 
In considering producer strategies and decisions, it would be interesting to explore 
what motivates or prevents a producer from using a GI available in their location, given 
that these designations seem to be an accessible way to differentiate their output and 
secure a premium. Another would be to formally evaluate GI use and branding in the 
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context of alternative product and advertising strategies by individual producers or 




8. Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.1. Summary of GI valuation studies included in the final analysis: 
No. Authors Year Food Category Methods 
No. of 
Estimates 
1 *Akaichi et al. 2009 Fruit-Veggie Other 1 
2 Bombrun et al. 2003 Wine Hedonic 12 
3 Bonnet et al. 2001 Cheese Other  1 
4 Botonaki et al. 2004 Wine Other 1 
5 Costanigro et al. 2009 Wine Hedonic 7 
6 Fotopoulos et al. 2001 Olive Oil Conjoint 1 
7 Fotopoulos et al. 2003 Fruit-Veggie Conjoint 2 
8 **Galli et al. 2010 Cheese Other 31 
9 *Groot et al. 2009 Fruit-Veggie Conjoint 1 
10 Hassan et al. 2006 Cheese/ Meat Hedonic 2 




12 Loureiro et al. 2000 Meat Hedonic 6 
13 McCluskey et al. 2007 Fruit-Veggie Conjoint 1 
14 Menapace et al. 2011 Olive Oil Conjoint 3 
15 Mesias et al. 2010 Meat Other 1 
16 Mueller-Loose et al. 2011 Wine Hedonic 11 
17 Oczkowski et al. 1994 Wine Hedonic 20 
18 Quagrainie et al. 2003 Fruit-Veggie Other 5 
19 Sanjuan-Lopez et al. 2009 Fruit-Veggie Hedonic 3 
20 Santos et al. 2005 
Olive Oil/ Cheese/ 
Wine 
Hedonic 9 
21 Schamel et al. 2006 Wine Hedonic 6 
22 *Skuras et al. 2002 Wine Other 1 
23 Stefani et al. 2005 Grain Conjoint 3 




25 Teuber et al. 2010 Coffee Hedonic 4 
*Excluded from final sample due to outlier estimates 
**Four estimates excluded from final sample due to outlier estimates 
46 
 
Table 2.2. Description of variables: 




WTP (%) Value of the product in percentage price premium (+/ -
) % 21.32 37.8 -36.73 181.9 
WTP no outliers Observations lying outside +/- 2 standard deviations 
from the mean are excluded 15.12 26.13 -36.73 90.6 
WINE Binary variable coded 1 if the product is in Wine 
Category, 0 otherwise  0.47 0.50 0 1 
CHEESE Binary variable coded 1 if the product is in Cheese 
Category, 0 otherwise  0.24 0.43 0 1 
COFFEE Binary variable coded 1 if the product is in Coffee 
Category, 0 otherwise  0.03 0.17 0 1 
MEAT Binary variable coded 1 if the product is in Meat 
Category, 0 otherwise  0.07 0.25 0 1 
FRUIT/VEGGIE Binary variable coded 1 if the product is in 
Fruit/Veggie Category, 0 otherwise  0.10 0.31 0 1 
OLIVE OIL Binary variable coded 1 if the product is in Olive Oil 
Category, 0 otherwise  0.05 0.22 0 1 
GRAIN Binary variable coded 1 if the product is in Grain 
Category, 0 otherwise  0.04 0.19 0 1 
PDO Binary variable coded 1 if product is PDO, 0 
otherwise 0.45 0.50 0 1 
PGI Binary variable coded 1 if product is PGI, 0 otherwise 0.09 0.28 0 1 
TRADEMARK Binary variable coded 1 if product is defined as a 
Trademark or AVA (for wines) in original paper, 0 
otherwise 0.21 0.41 0 1 
REGIONAL Binary variable coded 1 if product is regional (no 
specific geographic regulation), 0 otherwise  0.35 0.44 0 1 
PRIMARY DATA Binary variable coded 1 if primary data, 0 if secondary 
data sources are used 0.18 0.38 0 1 
CONJOINT Binary variable coded 1 if methodology is Conjoint, 0 
otherwise  0.07 0.26 0 1 
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HEDONIC Binary variable coded 1 if methodology is Hedonic, 0 
otherwise  0.60 0.49 0 1 
OTHER Binary variable coded 1 if methodology is not 
Conjoint, Hedonic; 0 otherwise 0.33 0.47 0 1 
LOW/INTERMEDI
ATE PROCESSED 
Binary variable coded 1 if product involves low to 
intermediate processing, 0 otherwise(meat, grain, 
olive oil, coffee) 0.19 0.39 0 1 
HIGHLY 
PROCESSED 
Binary variable coded 1 if product involves a high 
level of processing, 0 otherwise (cheese, wine) 0.71 0.45 0 1 
FRESH PRODUCE Binary variable coded 1 if product is retailed fresh, 0 
otherwise (fruit/ veggies) 0.10 0.31 0 1 
FULL-BRAND Binary variable coded 1 if product is most likely to 
have a brand (wine, olive oil), 0 otherwise 0.52 0.50 0 1 
MIXED-BRAND Binary variable coded 1 if product could have a brand 
(meat, cheese), 0 otherwise 0.31 0.46 0 1 
NO BRAND  Binary variable coded 1 if product most likely does 
not have a brand (fruit/veggie, grain, coffee), 0 















Figure 2.3.  Product categories by quality assurance scheme 
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PDO 12.03* 20.69*** 8.58*** 30.69*** 21.91*** 
 
(6.63) (4.13) (1.78) (7.96) (3.53) 
PGI 5.77 -37.23 -69.07*** 10.29 -7.65 
 
(14.89) (25.41) (20.48) (12.78) (4.62) 
Trademark 35.05*** 39.01***  39.08*** 39.56*** 
 
(6.11) (0.92)  (0.93) (1.03) 
Primary Data -10.05 -1.28 -0.99 -0.95 1.82 
 
(9.83) (9.65) (10.55) (9.36) (11.07) 
Conjoint 17.57 53.75*** 60.41*** 44.67*** 58.29*** 
 
(13.64) (15.87) (18.02) (15.37) (15.94) 
Hedonic 1.43 63.78*** 65.36*** 51.68*** 62.65*** 
 
(10.18) (3.5) (2.46) (7.98) (4.20) 




(15.28) (3.5) (2.64) (15.42) (17.02) 




Adjusted-R2 0.241 0.666 0.814 0.636 0.656 
F-stat 4.51 - 319.4 344.58 330.3 
 
(0.000) - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 134 134 71 134 134 













Table 2.6. Product Characteristics influencing GI price premium  
 
Characteristic High Percent Premium Low Percent Premium 
Product 
Grain, fruits, vegetables, 
agricultural produce 
Wine, olive oil, cheese 
Length of Supply Chain Short Long 
Numbers of Producers More (farmers) Less (Food Industry) 
Brand Names Generally No Generally Yes 
Processing level Generally Low Generally High 
Product/ Quality 
Differentiation 
Lower, depends on product 
variety cultivar 






Source: adapted and simplified from Shapiro (1983) and Menapace and Moschini (2012) 
Figure 2.7. Equilibrium reputation premium  Pr  for producing at quality level  1q with 
single ( 1
0q , upper panel) and double (
1
0q  and 
2
0q , lower panel) minimum quality 
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Assessing Consumer Response to Nutrition Labeling Information and  




The main objective of food labeling is to inform consumers about product 
characteristics that play an important role in the purchase decision-making process, but 
are hard to observe and assess by consumers (Caswell et al., 2011). For example, the 
effect of food nutrients on human health cannot be immediately determined even after 
consumption. Thus, nutrition-based food labels have been implemented to educate 
consumers about healthy eating and enable them to make healthy food choices 
(Higginson, 2002). In the US, there is a long history of nutrition regulation culminating 
with the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) passed by Congress in 1990 
(Drichoutis et al., 2011). The NLEA went into effect in 1994 and gave the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) the authority to require specific nutritional labeling. The 
regulation also required a new format for the nutrition information panel and standardized 
serving sizes. Prior to implementation of the NLEA, food manufacturers provided 
nutritional information on a voluntary basis (Drichoutis et al., 2011).  
 However, even though nutritional labeling is assumed to allow consumers to 
make healthier food choices, obesity rates as one of the most important consequences of 
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poor consumption decisions, are still rising in the USA (Berning et al., 2008, 2010). The 
World Health Organization (2008) reports 1.5 billion overweight adults and at least 500 
million obese adults in the world. By 2015, these figures are expected to rise to 2.3 
billion overweight and 700 million obese adults (WHO, 2008). Research reveals 
generally low levels of use of the information on product labels (Higginson, 2002). In 
Europe, Higginson (2002) reports that only 22-59% of British adults look particularly for 
nutrition information when shopping, while a study with US consumers (Roe, 1999) finds 
that truncated information searches (looking only at front product label) decreases the 
level of accurate health benefit inferences made by consumers. When the back nutrition 
panel is also used, the amount of nutrition information is hard to compare across products 
and only one or two nutrition facts (generally fat or sugar) are used in decision-making 
(Black et al., 1992; Higginson et al., 2002). 
 Similar to nutrition, other credence aspects of foods such as the environmental 
impact of food products, present information asymmetry problems for buyers. The 
environmental impact of a product has been revealed to be a significant food value to 
consumers (Lusk et al., 2009) and studies show that demand for more environmentally 
friendly foods does exist (Blend et al., 1999). Yet, there is no standardized way of 
conveying environmental information to consumers. 
 With these general guidelines in mind, fluid milk is chosen as the researched 
product. Soy milk is also included in the study as a milk substitute with varied nutrition 
and environmental outcomes. Milk is a commonly used consumer product in the US and 
a very familiar product to consumers. In terms of nutrition, milk may have a variety of 
effects on human health depending on its levels of fat, sugar, carbohydrates, etc. Milk 
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production also has various potential harmful effects on the environment. These negative 
effects influence air quality (through production and transportation), soil quality (via 
appropriate grazing and waste management practices), water quality (by monitoring 
waste runoff), etc. (Center for US Dairy, 2010; EPA, 2007).  As evidence of dairy’s 
significant connection to environmental concerns, surveying more than 500 farms and 50 
processing plants across the U.S, a greenhouse gas (GHG) Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) 
for fluid milk found that that the carbon footprint of a gallon of milk, from farm to table, 
is 17.6 pounds of carbon dioxide. In conjunction with other secondary research, the study 
finds that U.S. dairy contributes approximately 2 percent to the total U.S. GHG emissions 
(Innovation Center for US Dairy, 2010). 
 Our study objectives are threefold. First, we assess how objective or subjective 
the interpretation of food labels is by measuring the cross-consumer concordance in 
perceptions regarding the healthiness of alternative fluid milk products under three 
information regimes: (1) only front label information, (2) front and back panel 
information, or (3) a product-specific nutrition index presented in conjunction with 
regular labels. In addition to assessing the nutritional and environmental information 
carried by front and back of package labels, we also consider the use of an index-type 
label summarizing nutritional information to probe further into what the literature has 
found about potential need for a more truncated search process by consumers. Indices, as 
summarized information, are found to be easier to read and compare across products 
(Viswanathan et al., 2002). For example, the Ratio of Recommended to Restricted food 
components (RRR Score) is a scientific measure of the product’s overall nutrient quality, 
based on the nutrients found on the back panel label (Scheidt et al., 2004). The 
63 
 
RRR Score is easily calculated as the ratio of food components that are beneficial for 
consumption (i.e., protein, dietary fiber, calcium, iron, vitamins A and C) compared with 
those that should be restricted (i.e., calories, sugars, cholesterol, saturated fat, and 
sodium) (Scheidt et al., 2004). The nutrition score takes values from 1-10, with 10 
suggesting a product having the most recommended to restricted food components and 1 
suggesting a product having the least recommended to restricted food components. We 
include the RRR index in our study to test whether it facilitates the transmission of 
detailed nutrition information in a concise and easy to use manner. 
Second, we want to determine whether consumers can determine the 
environmental impact of a product by using product cues.  More specifically, we will test 
the null hypothesis that, while regulated nutritional information is consistently interpreted 
across consumers, interpretation of the environmental impact remains more subjective. 
Third, we want to test if more concise information delivered in the form of an 
index (available only for the nutritional value), can effectively substitute for a complete 
list of product attributes.  Previous studies suggest that alternative formats of highlighting 
back panel nutrition information, such as shelf edge nutrition information emphasizing 
health claims (e.g., reduced sodium, or fat) significantly affects consumer preferences 
and behavior (Berning et al., 2008, 2010). How information is presented on the label is 
important in conveying a clear and uniform nutrition message. These findings can 
generate policy implications to inform future environmental labeling criteria by 
investigating various labeling methods to determine which of them conveys information 
to consumers in a more uniform fashion. 
64 
 
As a set, the findings from these research questions are empirically important in 
informing food businesses who differentiate themselves with credence attributes on how 
to effectively provide information to their customer base.  Moreover, each provides some 
important information for policy formulation and implementation in government-based 
labeling programs if public agencies seek to provide the most credible, useful information 





The traditional belief in classical economic theory is that consumer choices on 
food products are based on consumer preferences over food attributes. A representative 
consumer maximizes utility by consuming commodities having specific characteristics 
(McFadden, 2001). Alternatively, it has been shown that consumers may not have clear 
preferences over particular product attributes, but in turn, select products that are 
consistent with some internal values they have or some desired end-states they want to 
achieve through the act of consumption (Lusk et al., 2009; Gutman, 1982). Lusk et al 
(2009) speculate that while consumers may not have specific preferences over Calcium or 
Vitamin A intake (i.e., specific product attributes), they do have internally consistent 
rankings of “food values” such as high nutritional content, appearance or taste. Food 
values are a stable set of meta-preferences that drive consumers’ preferences for specific 
food attributes. These food values are abstract in nature (i.e., “convenience,” “tradition,” 
or “fairness”) and directly map into desired end-states consumers aspire towards (Lusk et 
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al., 2009). In other words, the labeled nutrition information maps into more general 
values consumers have with respect to health outcomes. In turn, these values translate 
into choices over competing products. 
The connection between psychological values and consumer behavior in the 
marketplace has been formalized in the means-end chain literature (Gutman, 1982). This 
theory specifies that people engage in activities (means) that guide them towards desired 
states of being (ends) such as happiness, belonging, accomplishment, etc. As a result, 
products are not only grouped into categories, but also into the functions they have in 
generating desired end-states. Choosing a product with a particular set of attributes over 
one with a different set of attributes is linked to specific consequences of the 
consumption act (Gutman, 1982). Consumers choose the product-attributes combination 
that maximizes their desired end-state.  
Nutrition or health is generally believed to be one of the most important end-
states sought by consumers. As one example, in a series of surveys assessing consumer 
motives for buying organic food, “Personal health/it is better for me/my family” was 
listed as a motive for 53% of surveyed participants in 1999, for 49% of surveyed 
participants in 2002, and 66% of surveyed participants in 2004 (Soil Association surveys 
in Padel et al., 2005).  
Nutrition is a credence attribute whose effect on human health cannot be 
immediately determined even after consumption. Government intervention in the form of 
standardized nutrition labeling is expected to alleviate the information asymmetry in the 
market where producers hold more information about product characteristics than 
consumers (Caswell, 1996). Nutrition labeling reduces moral hazard for producers to 
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misrepresent their products. For example, tasty food (an experience attribute) is generally 
unhealthy since it tends to have a high content of sodium, sugar, or fat. In absence of 
trusted nutrition labeling, producers will manufacture tasty (yet unhealthy) food over less 
tasty but healthier alternatives. Government mandated labeling acts as a “warranty” 
preventing producers from misrepresenting food products, as consumers have access to 
nutrition information that was previously “hidden”.  
Ideally, the mechanism (labeling) conveying this information to consumers is 
easy to read, use, and compare across products. In terms of how nutrition information is 
presented to consumers, several research contributions are worth mentioning. When a 
large amount of nutrition information is offered, poor performance in identifying 
healthier alternatives is often observed (Levy, et al., 1996), possibly because too much 
information may lead to “information overload” (Golan et al., 2000). Listed daily values 
for each nutrient are found to have positive results in helping consumers identify 
healthier alternatives (Levy, et al., 1996). However, Viswanathan et al (2002) found that 
summary information (in the form of averages, or ranges) outperforms percent daily 
values in helping consumers judge the nutritional content of a brand when multiple 
brands are available for comparison. Alternative formats of highlighting back panel 
nutrition information, such as shelf edge nutrition information emphasizing some health 
claims (e.g., reduced sodium, or fat) significantly affects consumer preferences and 
behavior (Berning et al., 2008, 2010), suggesting that label format is important. Kiesel et 
al (2010) also find that labels that reduce search costs by summarizing the information on 
the nutrition panel change consumer purchase behavior. Overall, it appears that 
consumers do not perform well when they have to do math calculations or handle 
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quantitative information (Eves et al., 1994; Hawkes, 2004; Levy and Fein, 1998). 
Therefore, formats that allow consumers to avoid quantitative tasks in order to derive 
information are preferred (Drichoutis et al., 2006). 
While health is indeed a top priority for consumers, other reasons underlying food 
choice have been increasing in importance for consumers lately. “Better for the 
environment/better for wildlife” was listed as a motive of buying organic food by 28% of 
surveyed participants in 1999 (Soil Association surveys in Padel et al., 2005). In a more 
broadly framed question in a 2002 study, 59% of surveyed participants list the 
environment as a motive for purchasing organic foods, and in 2004 this number increased 
to 78% of surveyed participants (Soil Association surveys in Padel et al., 2005). In five 
years, the percentage of people using the environment as a purchase criterion for organic 
foods more than doubled. Relative to other motives for buying organic foods listed in this 
survey (such as “taste” or “genetically-modified free”), product impact on the 
environment was the reason experiencing the highest rise in popularity among consumers 
across those years. Lusk et al (2009) also conclude that the environment (the effect of 
food production on the environment) is a significant value guiding consumer choice. 
While nutrition is a vital contributor to human health and misinformation on this 
front can potentially be life-threatening, environmental impact of food production 
generally does not have immediate life-threatening consequences. This may be one of the 
reasons for its delayed certification and lack of priority for the government to play a role. 
However, future impacts on quality of life due to environmental problems may affect 
human welfare in the long run. In addition, firms can misrepresent products as 
environmentally-friendly (by advertising “local” production, for example, as means of 
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reducing carbon footprint). While local products may reduce food miles, they can be 
environmentally damaging in other aspects (through other forms of energy consumption, 
for example). When consumers do not have access to overall environmental impact, firms 
highlight positive claims while ignoring or omitting negative implications of their 
production and marketing systems. 
One way to signal environmental friendly products to consumers is through 
voluntary eco-labeling. Eco-labels entail an assessment of the product’s impact on the 
environment including production process, use, and disposal of the product (van 
Raveswaay et al., 1997). Since they are not directly regulated by the government, eco-
labels are considered market-oriented (Loureiro et al., 2001). Voluntary use of eco-labels 
by producers must suggest some benefits such as increased demand, product 
differentiation, or obtaining a price premium. However, products that are more 
environmentally friendly identify as such, while products that are damaging for the 
environment are not identified or penalized as “bads”. In the context where only top 
environmental performers are labeled, consumers may purchase a particularly “bad” 
product for the environment believing that it is actually “average” or “good” for the 
environment. In short, eco-labeling rewards “good” performers, while it does not penalize 
“bad” ones.  
Investigating seafood products, Johnston et al (2006) find that, at parity of taste, 
consumers may consider switching to less-preferred fish species that carry the eco-label. 
This indicates that demand for environmentally-friendly goods may increase if other 
characteristics, such as taste, are at par with similar, less environmentally-friendly, 
products. In a laboratory experiment, Cason (2002) finds evidence that certified green 
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labeling by governments mitigates asymmetric environmental information and can elicit 
higher valuation from consumers. A study on eco-labeled apples also finds substantial 
demand for this product compared to similar, non-labeled, apples (Blend et al., 1999). At 
a zero price premium per pound, 72.6% of the surveyed consumers said they would buy 
eco-labeled apples. As the price premium increases to $0.40, the purchase probability of 
labeled apples decrease, but about 40% of the sample would still buy the eco-labeled 
good.  
A study with Danish consumers finds that individuals develop personal norms 
(such as product packaging) when choosing environmentally friendly products, and these 
norms are a significant predictor of their propensity to choose environmentally friendly 
options in the supermarket (Thǿgersen, 1999). This suggests that when credence 
attributes, such as the environmental impact of a product, are hard to assess, experience 
or search attributes can be used as proxies for harder to assess credence attributes. For 
example, food safety may be too costly to measure (e.g., the absence of pesticide 
residues) but management practices (e.g., organic farming) can be used as proxies for the 
final product characteristics (Grolleau et al., 2005).  When a lack of mandated 
environmental information exists, consumers can use product cues such as packaging 
material, location of production relative to point of sale, method of production (organic or 
conventional), etc., to determine which products are in their preferred environmentally-
friendly product set.  
The literature above outlines several concepts related to consumer behavior 
regarding nutrition and the environment. First, new additions to consumer choice theory 
suggest that individuals make purchase decisions in order to achieve desired end-states. 
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While individual product attributes factor into this decision, consumer preferences over 
attributes are less meaningful than preferences over desired end-states. Second, the best 
means for conveying credence information are still under debate for nutrition 
(summaries, percent daily values, list of attributes), and are very rudimentary (product 
cues) for the environment. Under the current labeling regime, what is the most consistent 
way of transmitting nutritional credence information to consumers? And, what lessons 
can be learned to inform future environmental labeling efforts? The rest of this paper 





The first objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of current nutrition 
labels in conveying information uniformly across consumers. To this end, we administer 
a best-worst scaling survey to rank 10 milk products according to their perceived 
nutritional impact. We use the progressive release of label information to observe how 
participants change their ranking when additional, perhaps more relevant, nutrition 
information is revealed. The resulting health rankings can be compared against the 
products’ actual nutrition values (provided by the RRR score) to identify ranking 
inconsistencies across participants under each treatment. In addition, agreement regarding 
rankings between participants can be measured for each information treatment.  
Best-worst choice experiments gained momentum in the early ‘90s with a 
publication by Finn et al (1992). Originally proposed in 1990 by Louviere and 
71 
 
Woodworth in a working paper, the best-worst method is rooted in Thurstone’s (1927) 
psychological method of paired comparisons. Sometimes also called max-diff, the method 
makes consumers compare all the pairs of alternatives available in a set and choose the 
one which maximizes the utility difference (between the best and the worst). The 
underlying assumption is that consumers have an intrinsic continuum of a value or degree 
of interest, and this method places the alternatives in the choice set along this continuum 
(Finn, 1992).  
In our case, this continuum is the “impact on my health” of our set of products. 
Best-worst has several advantages over traditional measures of measurement such as 
Likert scales. First, it forces people to make trade-offs by choosing a best and a worst 
alternative. On the other hand, on a scale system, all alternatives could be viewed as 
“best/ important” or “worst/ least important” (Lusk, 2009). Second, people interpret 
ordinal scales differently. When a person chooses a 5 from a scale of 1 to 5, this can 
actually represent a 4 for another respondent (Lusk, 2009). However, there is no 
measurement bias in the best-worst scale relative to the Likert scale as there is only one 
best-worst pair each consumer can choose (Cohen et al., 2002). Therefore, best-worst 
coefficients are directly comparable between people and result in individual as well as 
aggregate ranking scales. Third, despite the sometimes large number of choice sets and 
the repetitiveness of the exercise, participants find the task easy and quick to complete 
(Goodman et al., 2005, Auger et al., 2004, Cohen et al., 2002). Fourth, compared to 
simply ranking products directly from 1-10, best-worst ranking is more accurate as it 
reduces the cognitive burden for participants and is able to discriminate between products 
that, at first glance, appear to be equally important.  
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In this study, the best-worst task follows an orthogonal design that distributes the 
alternatives (products) across choice sets. A balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) 
was created with our ten products, such that across 15 choice sets, each product appears 
the same number of times (6 times) and each individual set contains 4 products
7
. Some 
experimental designs used in the literature so far (Finn et al., 1992, Lusk et al, 2009, 
Goodman et al., 2005) are not uniform in the sense that the choice sets are of unequal size 
(for example, some have 4 alternatives, while others have 5). This can be confusing or 
difficult for participants to adjust to. Experimental designs such as BIBDs overcome this 
weakness (Lusk, 2009). BIBDs also have the advantage that each alternative (product) is 
shown the same number of times (in this study, 6 times) and that the pair-wise 
frequencies are equal (Kuhfeld, 2010). This ensures that no one product is under- or over-
represented in the experiment, and consumers see each product the same number of times 
individually and paired with the rest of the products.  
Ten actual milk products that differ in their nutritional characteristics are selected 
for the experiment based on several nutrition attributes. As nutrition characteristics that 
are important to consumers, we include: organic (yes/no), chocolate flavoring (yes/no), 
fat (whole milk vs. reduced fat), and soy (yes/no). Soymilk increases the variation in 
nutritional and environmental outcomes across products, which is a desired characteristic 
in our product selection process. Table 3.1 presents the design matrix yielding the ten 
milk products of various nutrition outcomes. 
 
(See Table 3.1) 
                                                 
7
 In SAS, the %mktbsize and %mktbibd macros were used to generate a BIBD design with 10 attributes, 4 




Throughout this process, our goal is not to create a perfect experimental design, 
but to uniformly integrate real-life products into a laboratory experiment. The main 
purpose of this design matrix is to ensure that the products entering the experiment cover 
a wide spectrum of nutritional outcomes. The RRR scores of our selected products are 
provided in Table 3.2 and a visual interpretation in Figure 3.3, where it is evident that 
most of the chosen attributes cannot be used to immediately predict the RRR score: 
chocolate milk has scores ranging from 5.2 to 5.9; soy milk (not flavored) ranges from 
9.9-10. While the RRR score does not show any nutritional improvements for “organic” 
products, some consumers believe organic products to be healthier (Magnusson et al., 
2001 and 2003; Emma, 2005). 
 
(See Table 3.2 and Figure 3.3) 
 
In the literature, most conjoint and choice experiments use theoretical 
combinations of product attributes and attribute levels in order to distinguish the effect of 
each treatment individually on the choice consumers make. However, these hypothetical 
product choices are artificially constructed and generally do not represent real 
alternatives consumers encounter in everyday life. At the expense of relaxing design 
characteristics, this study distinguishes itself by providing respondents with real choices 
(products) they could encounter in a local grocery store on any given day. One advantage 
of this approach is that consumers are already familiar with the products in the study and 
the information on product label. While in real-life shopping experiences consumers 
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purchase milk according to different reasons (taste, price, craving a particular flavor); we 
asked our study participants to inspect the label with a specific focus on health outcomes, 
so that we can distinguish the effect of product characteristics on perceived nutrition. 
The label information treatments included in the survey progress from the lowest 
to the highest information content: (1) Front label; (2) Front + back label; (3) Front label 
+ RRR score; (4) Front label + back label + RRR score. In total, 148 people participated 
in the nutrition survey, and each participant was exposed to more than one treatment. The 
information delivered in each treatment is shown in Figure 3.4.  
 
(See Figure 3.4) 
 
In the end, 101 participants were exposed to the Front label only, 51 to the Front 
and Back labels, 97 to the Front, Back and RRR, and, finally, 47 to the Front and RRR. 
Examples of the best-worst questions with different label treatments are provided in 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6. 
 
(See Figures 3.5 and 3.6) 
 
The motivation for sequencing label treatments from the lowest to the highest 
information resolution is rooted in grocery store behavior. In the grocery store, 
consumers are presented with several options for the same product category on the store 
shelf. These products have the front label facing out, and generally, browsing the front 
label is enough for some consumers to make a purchase decision. Others prefer to pick up 
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the product and consult the more detailed nutrition information on the back nutrition 
panel. When back panel information is hard to read or compare across products, 
summarized information such as the RRR may be easier to interpret. In the survey, the 
RRR Score is incorporated in the product label as a number in a black square in the right-
hand side corner of the front of the milk container (see Figure 3.5).  
 
The second study objective is to measure the information gap following the lack 
of environmental labeling. A similar best-worst ranking exercise to nutrition is 
performed, this time asking participants to choose the best and the worst product form 
several options according to their perceived environmental impact.  
Research shows consumers use product cues such as product packaging to 
determine a product’s impact on the environment (Thǿgersen, 1999). We use several 
popular environmental cues to identify milk products with various impacts on the 
environment: organic (yes/no), local (Colorado Proud label vs. none), container type 
(plastic vs. cardboard). Soy milk is also included as an option in the environmental 
section of the survey, as soy milk production may be perceived as environmentally 
different from animal milk production. Scientifically, it is not clear yet which milk type 
(soymilk or cow milk) has a larger impact on the environment. While the production 
process of soymilk could be more environmentally friendly (less methane emissions), 
processing soybeans into milk can be more energy-intensive than processing milk 
(Silverman, 2010). Table 3.7 provides summarized information of the design matrix and 




(See Table 3.7) 
  
A similar best-worst ranking exercise following a BIBD with 15 sets of 4 
products each is implemented for participants to determine the environmental impact of 
the products. In the environmental survey, 96 consumers participated in ranking options.  
In the overall survey (nutrition and environment), a total of 244 people 
participated. In the summer of 2011, and in a subsequent recruitment session in spring 
2012, survey participants were recruited amongst Colorado State University (CSU) 
administrative staff and general Colorado population based on a first-reply policy to our 
invitation e-mail. Multiple sessions of 20-25 participants each were delivered via 
computer in a controlled setting in a laboratory on CSU premises. A catalog with 
enlarged pictures of the products included in the survey was provided to each participant 
as an additional visual support complementing the product pictures on the computer 
screen. The survey completion time varied from 25-50 minutes and participants were 
paid a flat compensation of $25 for their time. In addition to the best-worst nutrition and 
environmental sections described above, socio-demographic questions identical for all 
versions of the survey were included. They solicited information about household 
composition, education, income, gender, age, and ethnicity. 
Responses assessing participants’ dietary habits and environmental attitudes were 
collected to be used in subsequent analyses as controls for individual dietary preferences. 
The dietary questions, provided in Table 3.8, are a subset of the Index of Diet Quality 
(Leppala et al., 2010). Based on several specific dietary habit responses, a diet index is 




(See Table 3.8) 
 
The same rationale motivates questions assessing participants’ environmental 
concern. These questions are a subset of the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) Scale, 
which is considered the standard instrument in the social and behavioral sciences for 
measuring concern about the environment (Dunlap et al., 2000). Following Kotchen et al 
(2007), five statements from the NEP scale presented in Table 3.9 were included in the 
survey as a control for the respondent’s environmental attitudes in subsequent analyses. 
 
(See Table 3.9) 
 
 
4. Sample Demographics 
 
The study sample statistics provided in Table 3.10 are comparable to Colorado 
state-wide demographics provided by the US Census Bureau (US Census Quick facts, 
2012). Demographics are provided separately for participants in the health and the 
environmental sections of the survey. In terms of racial composition the statistics show: 
whites (non-Hispanic) 70% of the population in Colorado, but ranging from 83% to 93% 
in our sample; black constituted 4% of Coloradans, but only 1-4% in our sample; Asians 
were 2.8% of Coloradans and 1-2% of our sample; and Hispanics were 11.3% of the 
Colorado population but only 2-5.2% of our sample. The median household income in 
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the state of Colorado (years 2006-2010) is $56,456. This is comparable to our sample 
median of $50,000-75,000. 
 
(See Table 3.10) 
 
Most households have up to two members (83-89%) or more (10-17%). This is 
indicative of young families with no kids (75% of the sample also has no children). 
However, 25% of the sample does have one or more kids. This is especially useful in the 
context of our survey since families with kids tend to buy milk frequently and are very 
familiar with the product. 
In terms of demographics, 71-74% of our sample is female. This is in agreement 
with the fact that most of our respondents are primary shoppers (80-88%), since generally 
it is the female in house household who also takes the lead in grocery shopping. 
Regarding other socio-economic characteristics, the average education level in 
our sample is probably higher than the national average. Most participants have a 
graduate degree (39-49%). 30-37% of respondents have a college degree, while the rest 
have technical (9-12%), some graduate (7-10%), and high school studies (2-3%). For 
income, there is a wide variation with the lowest income under $20,000 and the highest 
one of over $150,000. Generally however, the highest percentage of respondents report a 
household income of about $50-74,000 (25-30%), followed by $35-49,000 (15-19%) and 





5. Empirical Methodology 
 
The first objective of the data-analysis is to investigate consumer ranking of milk 
products according to their perceived environmental impact and perceived nutrition 
outcome under different information treatments. 
 To this purpose, best-worst data is analyzed using the counting method (Lusk et 
al, 2009). This implies that the final “rank” of a particular product, j, is calculated as the 
difference between the amount of times it has been voted “best” and the amount of times 
it has been voted “worst” across all study participants: 
 
Where i=individual, j=product, k= choice sets 
When the resulting rankings are sorted in decreasing order, the product with the 
highest “score” is ranked first and interpreted as being the overall most important to 
consumers, the next one is the second highest in importance, and so on. This analysis will 
provide a complete ranking under each information treatment. 
 
The second study objective is to test the null hypothesis that, while regulated 
nutritional information is consistently interpreted across consumers, interpretation of the 
environmental impact remains more subjective. Here, we can also investigate whether a 
nutrition index can substitute an entire list of nutrition attributes. In order to achieve this 
goal, we compare the concordance in environmental ranking to the concordance in 
nutrition ranking under different information treatments.  
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Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) is a measure of the agreement among m 
judges who are assessing a given set of n products. If product i is given rank ri,j by judge 
number i, then the total rank given to product j is . 
The sum-of-squares deviation (S) from the total rank given to product j is defined 
as: 
 ,  
Where  is the mean value of all the ranks: . Kendall’s W statistic 
is calculated from the previous as: 
 
Kendall's W ranges from 0 (meaning no agreement, responses may be regarded as 
essentially random) to 1 (complete agreement between raters). Intermediate values of W 
indicate a greater or lesser degree of unanimity among respondents. In this study, the W 
test is calculated for each nutritional information treatment individually and separately 
for the environmental ranking.  
 
The third objective of this study is to investigate how consumers assess 
environmental and nutrition product outcomes by using environmental product cues and 
nutrition attributes. To this end, a rank ordered logistic regression model is used to link 
nutrition and environmental outcome rankings to product characteristics. The rank 
ordered logistic model is an application of the conditional logit model for ranked 
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outcomes proposed by McFadden (1974). In the economics literature, this model was 
developed by Beggs et al (1981) and later by Hausman et al. (1987). In the marketing 
literature where it developed independently (Punj etal., 1978; Chapman et al., 1982), the 
term ‘‘exploded logit model’’ has been used (Drewes et al., 2006; Allison et al., 1994). 
However, both models are equivalent and are based on the random utility framework that 
also justifies the standard multinomial logit model (Luce, 1959; Allison et al., 1994).  
In a typical logit model measuring utility via revealed preference, consumers are 
presented with j alternatives which must be ranked. Individual i associates each 
alternative j with a specific level of utility Uij he or she derives from it (Drewes et al., 
2006).  
In our study, however, we ask participants to rank products according to their 
perceived nutritional or environmental impact. Nutrition and environment are only some 
of the factors mapping into consumer utility derived from milk consumption. Other 
characteristics of products in set J affecting utility across consumers I are, for example, 
taste, value, price, texture, etc: 
 
In our experiment, individual i associates each product j with a specific level of 
nutrition (Nij) or environmental (Eij) outcome, and uses this latent scale to choose the best 
and worst products in a choice set. We assume that nutrition and environmental 
outcomes, Nij and Eij respectively, are composed of a systematic (  and a random (  





                                            (1) 
The systematic component , in turn, is generally assumed to be a linear 
function of the characteristics of the individual, Xi, and of the attributes of the 
alternatives Zj (i.e., the milk products). In this case, product attributes Zj, such as whole 
or organic milk do not vary across consumers i, but only across products j:  
                                       (2) 
Parameters β and δ capture the impact on perceived nutrition and environmental 
outcomes of changes in product attributes or personal characteristics. Because , the 
characteristics of individual participants do not vary across choice sets (the same 
individual makes a series of choices across multiple choice sets),  drops out of the 
model. This is a feature of the conditional and rank ordered logit models. If the effect of 
individual characteristics on choices is a relevant result, interaction terms between these 
characteristics (age, income, gender, etc.) and product characteristics that vary across 
choice sets (whole, chocolate, soy, etc.) can be created and included in the model in order 
to capture this effect.  
 
The conditional logit model where only one choice is considered allows 
maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters when participants make a “best 
choice” from a set of alternatives (Allison et al., 1994). However, in a best-worst setup, a 
series of choices are made and a complete ranking of alternatives (sometimes with 
ranking ties) can be inferred from these choices. In this case, the conditional logit model 
can be applied to each choice separately, creating an “exploded” logit model accounting 
for all choices an individual makes within a set of alternatives.  
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For example, within a choice set containing 4 items (A, B, C, and D), the 
probability for individual i to rank the products in this specific order can be expressed as 
the probability of choosing alternative A from the set A, B, C, D, multiplied by the 
probability of choosing alternative B from the remaining alternatives B, C, D, multiplied 
by the probability of choosing alternative C from the remaining alternatives C and D 
(Train, 2009). 
 
          (3) 
When ties in ranking between two alternatives occur, as is the case with the 
current dataset, the assumption is that the respondent has a preference ordering for the 
tied items, but we don’t know what it (this approach is formalized in Allison et al., 1994). 
In our dataset, from a set of 4 products, the respondent may assign rank 1 to A, the “best” 
product, and rank 4 to D, the “worst” product. The remaining two products, named here 
2.5B and 2.5C, are tied for rank 2.5 (the average between rank 2 and rank 3). Here, there 
are two possibilities: item 2.5B is preferred to item 2.5C, or item 2.5C is preferred to item 
2.5B (Allison et al., 1994). Because these alternatives are mutually exclusive, Pr (2.5B or 
2.5C) = Pr(2.5B) + Pr(2.5C). Following this logic, the probability for tied items 
accounting for the remaining item D, ranked fourth, is: 
 
          (4) 
The final model contains the product of 15 choice sets of the form displayed in 
equation (3) above, with ties. To obtain a generalized expression, within a choice set of 
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four items, let Yij be the rank given by respondent i to item j. Then let δijk = 1 if Yij ≥ Yik, 
and δijk = 0 otherwise. Finally, in an abbreviated form, following Allison et al (1994), the 
likelihood function Li for one individual across all choice sets (ignoring ties for 
simplicity) can be generalized as: 
 
(5) 
For a sample of n respondents, the expression (5) above yields the following 
model which can be estimated via maximum likelihood: 
 
          (6) 
As mentioned previously, the systematic component  is a linear function of the 
characteristics of the individual, Xi, and of the attributes of the products Zj (in this case, 
the milk products). Substituting the expression for  defined in (2) into expression (6) 
above results in the models to be estimated in this study. 
 
Four different models of this type are estimated in this study. 
Model (1) quantifies the impact of nutrition product attributes (such as whole, 
organic, chocolate flavored, or soy) on nutritional outcomes under different information 
treatments. The systematic component 
  is substituted in 




Model (2) quantifies the impact of environmental product attributes (such as 
organic, local, cardboard, or soy) on environmental outcomes. The systematic component 
  is substituted 
in equation (6).  
 
Model (3) quantifies the impact of nutritional information on the back panel label 
(such as fat content, protein content, etc) on nutritional outcomes. The systematic 
component   is 
substituted in equation (6). The nutrition categories included in this specification are 
chosen while attempting to decrease the high correlation coefficients between the 
different attributes. For example, calories are highly correlated to cholesterol level, 
sodium levels, and carbohydrates. In this case, only one of these attributes 
(carbohydrates) was included in the model. A correlation matrix detailing these 
connections is provided in Table 3.11.  
 
(See Table 3.11) 
 
Model (4) quantifies the cumulative impact on ranking of all information 
available under each information treatment (nutritional information, product attributes, 
and the RRR score). The systematic component is specified here is an example including 
the maximum resolution of information (currently under the front + back panel + RRR 




is substituted in equation (6). 
 
For the rest of the information treatments, the specification above changes to 
include only the existing information within each individual treatment. 
 
Within the framework defined above, product ranking is assumed to correspond to 
the different levels of environmental and nutrition outcomes. A product that is ranked 
higher (i.e., closer to rank 1 which is the “best”) signals an increased nutritional or 
environmental outcome to the consumer. Due to the “panel” nature of the data (each 
participant is linked to 15 choice sets each containing four rankings), we use a robust 
(clustered on each participant) estimator of the variance-covariance matrix in conjunction 
with the ranked ordered logit models specified above. 
While the individual coefficients of these models cannot be interpreted in 
probabilistic terms without a transformation in the form of log odds ratio or likelihood 
(Long et al., 2006), their sign and magnitude can be considered to be the relative impact 
of product attributes on nutritional or environmental outcomes. A positive coefficient is 
interpreted, in this case, as the increase in rank due to a marginal increase in the product 
attribute. However, an increase in rank implies, for example, going from 1
st
 place to 2
nd
 
place, which is actually a decrease in perceived outcome due to the attribute. In other 
words, positive coefficients indicate that consumers believe the attribute to be “bad” for 





(1) Results for Nutrition  
Regarding nutrition outcomes, the results consist of the product rankings under 
different information treatments, concordance of rankings, and effect of product and 
nutrition attributes on the ranking structure.  
Tables 3.12-3.15 illustrate how the 10 milk products were ranked according to 
their perceived nutritional impact under four different information treatments. The 
ranking for the Front label only are presented in Table 3.12. The first product is ranked in 
first place (Horizon Organic Fat Free Milk) with a sizeable agreement of 74 favorable 
votes more than the following product that would be ranked 2
nd
 place (Silk Organic 
Unsweetened Soymilk). Participants also identify the least healthy product by a high 
margin (119 votes). Comparison to the true nutritional ranking offered by the RRR score 
reveals that most of the products (8 out of 10) are inconsistent with the RRR ranking.  
 
(See Table 3.12) 
 
When participants are exposed to the Front and Back nutritional label, the RRR 
score reveals that again 8 out of 10 products are inconsistent with the RRR as shown in 
Table 3.13. In Table 3.14, under the Front and RRR treatment only 4 out of 10 products 
are inconsistent with the RRR ranking, while under the Front, Back and RRR treatment 




(See Tables 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15) 
 
 The least healthy product is consistently identified as “Lucerne Reduced Fat 
Chocolate Milk”, while this product does not have the lower scientific nutritional score. 
“Horizon Organic Whole Milk” and “364 Whole Milk” have a lower score than their 
chocolate milk alternatives that are reduced fat. Products that are organic tend to be 
ranked higher in the nutritional rankings than similar products featuring conventional 
farming. For example, “365 Organic Soymilk Chocolate” is ranked consistently higher 
than its counterpart “Silk Chocolate Soymilk”, even though their RRR scores are the 
same.  
 Under all information treatments, consumers appear to rely the most on the 
nutritional information found on product labels to make decisions. Table 3.16 presents 
the most cited reasons for consumer rankings (where each participant could choose up to 
three reasons).  
 
(See Table 3.16) 
 
 When the RRR score is available, its usage is secondary to other nutritional 
information contained on the product. Familiarity with the product and other reasons 
(such as medical conditions or organic farming) are less frequently used than the nutrition 
information and the RRR score. Product brand and attractiveness of the label are used the 




 The coefficient of concordance, Kendall’s W, measuring ranking agreement 
amongst consumers under different label information treatments, is presented in Table 
3.17.  The statistic is accompanied by a p-value associated with the null hypothesis that 
there is no agreement between judges (in other words, when the p-value lacks statistical 
significance, W=0). The W reveals that when participants are only exposed to the front 
label of the product, their agreement on ranking products according to their perceived 
healthiness is less than average. On a scale of 0 to 1, with 0 expressing no agreement and 
1 denoting complete agreement, participants are measured with a coefficient of 0.4 when 
exposed to the front label only.  
 
(See Table 3.17) 
 
 When the back label is also available, participants tend to make more consistent 
decisions (amongst each other) and the concordance score is as high as 0.6. Adding the 
RRR score to the front and back label maintains the concordance at 0.6. An interesting 
result, however, is that when the RRR score is added to the front label only, the 
concordance coefficient is 0.6 suggesting that the RRR score may provide equivalent 
product cues compared to the information on the back of the label.  
 
 Examining the results from the different specifications of the rank ordered logistic 
model we observe the effect of product attributes and nutrition characteristics on 
perceived nutrition outcomes for consumers. 
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 The effect of product attributes (whole milk, organic, chocolate, and soy milk) on 
consumer health ranking derived from Model (1) is presented in Table 3.18.  
 
(See Table 3.18) 
 
 Whole milk has a positive sign consistently across treatments, meaning that an 
increase in fat content of milk increases the health rank of that milk. An increasing rank 
(for example, going from number 1 to number 2) represents a lower nutrition outcome the 
product brings to consumers. In this case, milk that is whole or with chocolate flavor 
tends to be ranked lower. On the other hand, there is consensus that milk that is organic 
and soy milk tend to be better for human health and are ranked relatively higher.  
The effect of product attributes on perceived nutrition outcomes changes under 
different information treatments. When RRR information is revealed, whole milk is 
penalized more than when front label only or front and back panel information is 
available (its estimate increases from 0.798 to 1.16 and 1.27). Organic farming improves 
nutritional perceptions among consumers. However, its positive effect on perceived 
nutrition outcomes is diminished by almost half under the RRR score (decreases from 
0.27 to 0.14). The effect of chocolate flavoring on nutrition ranking remains consistent 
under different information treatments. Its effect on health outcomes remains negative 
and is accentuated slightly under the RRR regime (from 1 to 1.18). Finally, soymilk has a 
stronger positive effect on nutrition outcomes when the back label or the RRR score are 
revealed (increasing from 0.1 to 0.38).   
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The effect of the back label nutritional attributes on health ranking is summarized 
from Model (3) in Table 3.19. Increasing the amount of total fat and carbohydrates in 
milk makes the product less healthy in the eyes of consumers. Increasing the amount of 
protein and iron in milk results in higher ranking as these products are perceived to be 
connected with positive health outcomes.  
 
(See Table 3.19) 
 
 When participants only have access to the front label, the detailed nutritional 
information is not available to them. However, guided by the product attributes reported 
on the front label, nutritional elements such as fats, carbohydrates, protein and iron have 
underlying effects on their health rankings. When participants also have access to the 
back label, the effect of nutritional information on product ranking becomes stronger. 
Fats and carbohydrates have a stronger effect in leading consumers to rank products 
lower, with coefficients increasing from 0.07 to 0.095, and 0.116 to 0.150 respectively. 
Iron has a stronger effect in ranking the products as healthier (from 0.23 to 0.30) when 
the back nutrition panel is revealed.  
 When the composite nutritional score, the RRR score, is revealed (in conjunction 
with the front and back or only with the front label) the effect on nutrition outcomes is 
similar in magnitude with the front and back label treatment.  
  
 The cumulative effect on ranking of all information available under different 
information treatments is revealed in the Model (4) results presented in Table 3.20. Under 
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the front label information treatment, the only information available to consumers 
includes the product attributes whole, organic, chocolate, and soy. These results are 
identical with those from Model (1). 
  
(See Table 3.20) 
 
Under the front and back treatment, consumers are exposed to nutrition attributes 
in addition to the binary product attributes on the front. There is a high correlation 
between front binary attributes and back nutritional characteristics, documented in Table 
3.21. For example, carbohydrates are highly correlated to chocolate, fat is correlated to 
whole, and soy correlates with protein. Despite these issues, when consumers are exposed 
to the front and back labels we see an increase in significance of the nutritional 
information on the back label and a decrease in importance of the binary attributes 
contained on the front.  
 
(See Table 3.21) 
 
When the RRR score is added to the front and back labels, there is hardly any 
significance probably due to collinearity among these informational messages.  
 
(2) Results for the Environment 
Regarding environmental outcomes, the results we present consist of product 
rankings consumers make based on product cues such as packaging (plastic/cardboard), 
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method of farming (organic/conventional), origin of production (local/not local), and type 
(milk/soy milk). Agreement among consumers about these perceptions of product cues is 
also measured, as well as if and how product cues affect ranking. 
 Table 3.22 illustrates the overall ranking of 10 milk products according to their 
perceived environmental impact. Unlike in the case of nutrition, there is no 
environmental measure similar to the RRR score to scientifically assess the 
environmental impact of these products. However, consumers agree, with a margin of 60 
“best” votes, that “Organic Valley Reduced Fat Milk (Cardboard)” has the perceived 
lowest negative impact on the environment.  
 
(See Table 3.22) 
 
All the cardboard carton milk products group into the upper half the ranking 
spectrum, except for the “Lucerne Reduced Fat Milk (Cardboard)” which is ranked in 9
th
 
place. Local products are located both at the top and in the mid-range of the ranking. The 
product with the most negative environmental impact as perceived by consumers is 
“Lucerne Reduced Fat Milk (Plastic)”, by a margin of 172 “worst” votes. While the most 
and least environmentally friendly products are notably separated by a high difference in 
the vote margins, products in ranks 3 through 7 have closer voting scores, which may 
indicate they are more difficult for consumers to distinguish amongst. 
Agreement in rankings across consumers is measured by the Kendall W 
concordance coefficient presented in Table 3.17. In this case, the W statistic is low, 
0.245. This low statistic suggests that, lacking clear environmental labeling and using 
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only product cues to inform their ranking, consumers appear to be in disagreement about 
their perceptions of the environmental effect of various milk products.  
Regardless of this variability in perceptions, participants do use existing product 
cues to infer the environmental impact of a product. The effect of product cues on 
ranking is presented in Table 3.23. Results show that the product is ranked higher (it is 
better for the environment) if it is produced by organic farming methods (as opposed to 
conventional), it is marketed in cardboard (as opposed to plastic) packaging, it is locally 
produced (versus non-local), and it is soy based (as opposed to more traditional cow 
milk).  
 
(See Table 3.23) 
 
 Soy milk has the biggest effect (0.093) on perceived environmental outcomes. 
The second largest effect is from local (0.057), followed by cardboard (0.039) and 
organic (0.032).  
 Similar results relative to consumer attitudes towards the environment are 
presented in Table 3.24. We measured participants’ concern for the environment using a 
subset of the questions in the New Environmental Paradigm questionnaire (Kotchen et 
al., 2007). The environmental concern score obtained this way follows a scale from 0-25, 
with higher numbers representing less concern for the environment. With the sample split 
on the median of the score (which is 15), 35 people are identified to be less concerned for 
the environment (with a score >15), and 61 are relatively more concerned for the 
environment (with a score <15). Consumers that are more concerned about the 
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environment in general display a higher sensitivity towards product cues such as organic 
farming and soy. For example, while the positive effect organic has on the environmental 
impact of a product is only -0.239 for people who are less concerned for the environment, 
this effect increases to -0.367 for people who are more concerned for the environment. 
Similarly for soy, the effect increases from -0.87 to -0.96. Cardboard packaging and local 
products have a similar effect regardless of the consumers’ environmental attitudes.  
 





This study finds that the amount and type of information on the product label can 
change consumer nutrition perceptions about the product using milk products as an 
empirical example. When the product search and comparison process is limited to 
commonly used front label indicators, there is less agreement regarding nutrition 
outcomes compared to situations where the more detailed back panel label and/or the 
RRR score are revealed. Chocolate and whole milk are generally ranked lower, and this 
negative effect on perceived nutrition is accentuated for whole milk under the RRR 
treatment. In contrast, organic and soy milks are generally ranked higher. While for soy 
this positive effect is enhanced under more information (back label, RRR), for organic it 
is reduced by half.  
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Generally, consumers have a low level of consensus about the environmental 
impact of food based on product cues. Soy milk has the biggest effect on perceived 
environmental outcomes. The second largest effect is from local production sourcing, 
followed by use of cardboard cartons and organic certification. For participants with 
higher concern for the environment, soy and organic have a higher positive effect on 
perceived environmental outcomes than for participants with less environmental concern.  
A direct implication of our research is that, while nutrition labels are tightly 
regulated by the government to assure standardized data and uniform communication of 
nutrition information, consumers still make choices that are inconsistent with scientific 
nutrition indices (such as the RRR) regarding the healthiness of food products. When the 
information available is limited to the front label, only two products (out of 10) are 
ranked “correctly” when compared to the scientific RRR ranking of products. But, this 
number increases to 4-6 products correctly ranked when the RRR score is revealed, so it 
does appear there is a logical response to better information by some consumers. 
Claims made on the front label both highlight and augment the information 
available in the nutrition facts panel. In some cases, however, front label claims can be 
misleading with respect to the overall perceived healthiness of the product. Here, claims 
such as organic farming play an important role in decisions about nutrition when the back 
panel information is not available or not consulted (such as in the case of truncated 
searches by time-constrained consumers). The positive impact of organic on perceived 
nutritional outcomes is second highest (-0.271), followed by the whole milk category 
(0.798). However, the link between healthier products and organic farming is 
inconclusive at best. Some studies have found that organic farming does not directly 
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contribute to a product’s nutritional makeup (Woese, 1997), while others have found a 
possible connection between the two (Worthington, 2001). When more detailed nutrition 
information is revealed, the importance of organic decreases (-0.205 when back panel is 
also available and -0.142 when the back panel and the RRR are also available), but it 
never disappears.  
In the meantime, the importance of other product claims such as soy is 
undermined in a situation where only the front label is consulted. The effect of soy on 
perceived nutritional outcomes (0.099) is lower than that of whole (0.798), chocolate 
(1.00), or organic (0.271) attributes. While soy signals low fat, increased protein and fiber 
content, and an overall healthy product, stronger perceived nutrition outcomes result from 
organic claims that are scientifically unsubstantiated (0.27) rather than the soy claims that 
are factual in nature (0.09).  
While tastes and preferences also play a role in the food purchase decision, we 
specifically asked the consumers in our study to select products based only on their 
nutritional/health impact. Inspecting consumer reasons behind their health ranking, we 
notice that their most quoted reason is the nutrition information on the label. Since they 
were allowed to choose more than one reason underlying their choice (generally there are 
multiple factors affecting consumer choice), for the front label treatment familiarity with 
the product is quoted next, along with “other” reasons (for example: “medical 
conditions”, “organic or not”, “personal wellness goals”, “sugar” and “fat” contents) as 
detailed in Table 3.16.  
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If consumers are generally using nutrition information to motivate their choice of 
healthy products, it may be that either the overall labels or the process of buying are 
misleading in some way.  
First, the overall product label can be misleading in several ways. Panel nutrition 
information can be difficult to comprehend and read (Black et al., 1992) or only one item 
on the nutrition label (usually fat or sugar) is used to guide judgments on the healthiness 
(Black et al., 1992; Higginson et al., 2002). Comparing different products based on an 
entire list of attributes is generally time-consuming. According to (Roe et al., 1999), the 
presence of health claims (on the front label) or positive product claims (such as organic 
farming) are associated with (1) a positivity bias, in which consumers provide a product 
better ratings merely because a health claim is present; (2) a halo effect, in which the 
presence of a health claim induces the consumer to rate the product higher on other 
attributes not mentioned in the claim; (3) a magic-bullet effect, in which consumers 
attribute inappropriate health benefits to the product.  
Second, the process of buying may also be misleading when only part of the 
information available is used (for example, the front label) while other sources (such as 
the back panel) are ignored. Respondents in a study by Roe et al. (1999) who either used 
a truncated information search (to front label only) or viewed claims on front label were 
more likely to purchase the product, regardless of whether a real claim is present and are 
less likely to result in health benefits not mentioned in the claim. When exposed only to 
the front labels, consumer concordance is low in ranking products according to 
nutritional values (W coefficient is 0.4). Front label attributes correlate to underlying 
nutritional attributes on the back panel, but they are generally less informative than 
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actually inspecting the back panel or consulting the RRR score. In short, these signaling 
indicators used by product marketers may exacerbated prior opinions consumers have 
about product categories (organic, soy), and these priors may be very heterogeneous 
among consumer groups.   
Additional information in the form of the RRR score or the product back nutrition 
panel corrects the asymmetric information and results in more concordant rankings across 
consumers. When the RRR score is posted on the front label of the product, it yields the 
same results (in terms of agreement across consumers) as thoughtful inspection of the 
back panel information. Thus, in order to improve the information asymmetry or 
truncated search behavior related to the product front label, the RRR score may be an 
easy-to-read add-on to the front label that yields similar results as exposure to the 
product’s back nutrition panel.  
 
Similar to the nutrition attribute, the environmental impact of a product is a 
credence outcome that cannot be evaluated even after consumption. Government 
regulation is the most effective way of correcting the information asymmetry problems 
related to credence attributes (Caswell, 1996), although reputations have also been known 
to help. Given the lack of government mandates on environmental labeling, product cues 
can be used even more strategically as a proxy for environmental impact. As a result, 
consumers are even more dispersed in their ability to determine the environmental impact 
based on these cues. The Kendall W coefficient of agreement amongst consumers 
regarding these ranking is 0.245, which indicates almost no agreement about the 
environmental impact of these products. Our results show that out of the four cues 
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investigated in this study (organic, cardboard, soy, local), consumers generally believe 
that soy milk has the biggest impact on whether a milk product is environmentally 
friendly or not (estimate is 0.093). However, there is no consensus in the scientific 
community on this matter yet (Silverman, 2010, Nicholson et al, 2011). Soy bean 
production may have more ”direct” impacts on the environment, such as deforestation in 
rapidly growing production regions such as the Amazon basin, while dairy cow 
production systems may  have an entirely different set of impacts, such as acidification 
and eutrophication (contamination of aquatic ecosystems).  Given the different nature of 
such impacts, comparisons, or distillation down to one indexed number may be 
impossible to achieve (compared to the consensus surrounding nutritional compounds 
and their impacts on health). 
On the other hand, the smallest perceived positive impact on the environment 
quantified by study participants is organic farming (0.032). Research comparing LCA for 
organic versus conventional farming methods is more conclusive than that comparing soy 
to cow milk. Findings show that in terms of acidification, both methods yield the same 
impact on the environment (Thomassen et al., 2008; de Boer, 2003), but lower impact 
from organic farming is reported in terms of lesser eutrophication (due to low fertilizer 
and pesticide use) and energy use (Thomassen et al., 2008; de Boer, 2003). While organic 
farming can be better for the environment than conventional farming, consumers in this 
study associate it weakly with environmental outcomes. On the other hand, soy milk may 
not be better for the environment than cow milk, but generates the highest gain in utility 
for consumers. In this case, environmental product cues are found to be misleading and 
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regulation in this area is necessary if consumers are to be correctly informed of these 
environmental consequences.  
Informing consumers through a list of attributes (for example, by listing the 
products’ impact on air, water, soil, energy use, etc.) may suffer from the same 
shortcomings as the nutritional list of attributes highlighted above. Here, we suggest that 
indices summarizing a list of attributes are just as accurate as and perhaps easier to 
interpret and compare than the former. But, it may be that the set of potential 
environmental indicators is too great or heterogeneous to allow for some simplification, 
or that different indices may be used depending on the environmental outcome of interest. 
As an example, land conservation and wildlife protection may be important to some 






This study uses best-worst scaling in a survey with a total of 244 participants to 
evaluate the effectiveness of current nutrition labels for milk products.  Moreover, the 
analysis allows one to compare communication outcomes from labels for a information 
category that is currently regulated (nutrition labeling) to those in an area that is not 
regulated (the environmental impact of food). 
The use of only front label information in making nutritional decisions leads to 
“incorrect” choices (8 out of 10 products are ranked incorrectly) and low agreement 
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between consumers regarding these choices (Kendall’s W is only 0.4 on a scale of 0 to 1 
where 1 implies complete agreement). Increasing the information resolution by adding 
the back nutrition panel or the RRR nutrition score to the front label improves ranking 
(only 4-6 products are assigned a “wrong” rank) and agreement (W coefficient increases 
to 0.6) relative to what one would expect for the information shared.  
One marketing (or policy) implication is that it may be appropriate to use the 
RRR score on the front label to help alleviate the information asymmetry derived either 
from a faulty product search process (i.e., truncated searches that only use front labels) or 
from the complex nature of labels themselves (lists of attributes are hard to compare 
across products). Other similar approaches, such as the “traffic light” sign have been 
suggested as possible solutions to this information problem (Drichoutis, 2006). By 
“traffic light” labeling, producers place colors next to each nutrient of a product, similar 
to traffic lights, which will indicate low, medium and high assessments of the nutrient 
(Drichoutis, 2006). However, this can make it hard for some “fat” products to sell even 
though they might be beneficial as part of the whole diet (Hawkes, 2004). Similarly, this 
form of labeling would just indicate the lack of “bad” components rather than the 
presence of “good” components (Drichoutis, 2006). For example components that might 
increase good cholesterol are not indicated by this labeling format. The RRR, on the other 
hand, summarizes the information on the back label in an Index and only penalizes the 
“bad” components (calories, sugars, cholesterol, saturated fat, and sodium) that surpass 
an upper limit set by the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (Schdeit et al., 2004). But, 
regardless of approach, it does seem that an update of how nutritional information is 
shared with consumers may be warranted. 
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While regulated nutritional information is more consistently interpreted across 
consumers when the full extent of information is available (back nutrition label and/or 
RRR score), interpretation of the environmental impact remains more subjective. 
Agreement between consumers in ranking 10 milk products according to their perceived 
environmental impact is low (W coefficient equals 0.2). In the context of occasions when 
consumers make purchase decisions based on environmental impact, this is an indication 
that more regulated labeling of environmental outcomes may be needed.  Alternatively, 
since the intended outcomes among consumers may vary more in this realm, marketing 






9. Tables and Figures 
 
Table 3.1. Design Matrix for Health 
 
Nutrition and Health Focus  (# Products=10) 
  Milk Soymilk 
 
Whole Reduced Fat Unflavored/unsweetened Chocolate 














Note: Products that fit design characteristics are: (1) Horizon Organic Whole Milk, (2) 365 Whole Milk,  
(3) Horizon Organic Fat Free Milk, (4) O Organics Organic Reduced Fat Chocolate Milk, (5) 365 Fat Free 
Milk, (6) Lucerne Reduced Fat Chocolate Milk, (7) Silk Organic Unsweetened Soymilk, (8) Silk 





Table 3.2. RRR Score of identified products for nutrition  
Product Ref. No.  Alternatives RRR Score 
         Milk 
(5)  365 Fat Free Milk 8.0 
(3)  Horizon Organic Fat Free Milk 7.7 
(4)  O Organics Organic Reduced Fat Chocolate  5.9 
(6)  Lucerne Reduced Fat Chocolate Milk 5.2 
(1)  Horizon Organic Whole Milk 4.5 
(2)  365 Whole Milk 4.5 
      Soymilk 
(7)  Silk Organic Unsweetened Soymilk 10.0 
(8)  Silk Unsweetened Soymilk 9.9 
(10)  Silk Chocolate Soymilk 5.7 




































Table 3.7. Design Matrix for Environmental Impact 
 Environmental Impact (# Products=10) 
 
                                                  Milk Reduced Fat                                            Soymilk 
  Cardboard                      Plastic Cardboard 
Organic 




CO proud  
(5) 







CO proud  
(4) 
Not CO proud 
(7) 




Note: Products that fit design characteristics are: (1) Organic Valley Reduced Fat Milk (Cardboard), (2) O Organics Reduced Fat Milk (Cardboard), (3) 
Lucerne Reduced Fat Milk (Cardboard), (4) Robinson Dairy Reduced Fat Milk (Cardboard), (5) Organic Valley Reduced Fat Milk (Plastic), (6) Horizon 
Organic Reduced Fat Milk (Plastic), (7) Lucerne Reduced Fat Milk (Plastic), (8) Farmer’s All Natural Reduced Fat Milk (Plastic), (9) 365 Organic 
Soymilk (Cardboard), (10) Silk Original Soymilk (Cardboard) 
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Table 3.8. Subset of Index of Diet Quality Questionnaire  
Subset of Index of Diet Quality Questionnaire 
How many days per week do you eat whole-grain products (e.g., wheat bread, 
oatmeal)? 
The milk you usually drink is: 
a)  whole milk 
b)  semi-skimmed with 2% fat 
c)  milk with 1% fat 
d)  fat free milk 
e)  I don’t drink milk  
How many days per week do you consume dairy products (e.g., milk, cheese, 
sour cream, yoghurt, etc)? 
How many days per week do you eat vegetables? 
How many days per week do you eat fruits and/or berries? 
How many days a week do you eat sweets (including chocolate)? 
 
Source: Adapted from Leppala et al., 2010 
 
 
Table 3.9. NEP statements to determine environmental attitudes 
NEP scale questions subset: 
1. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. 
2. The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly 
exaggerated. 
3. Human ingenuity will insure that we do not make the earth unlivable. 
4. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources. 
5. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern 
industrial nations. 
 
Notes: The 6-point Likert response scale: Strongly Disagree, Mildly Disagree, Neither agree not disagree, 














Table 3.10. Sample Characteristics 
    Health Environment 
Characteristic % of Sample % of Sample 
Gender Male 28.38 26.04 
  Female 71.62 73.96 
Race White, Non-Hispanic 92.57 83.33 
  Black, Non-Hispanic 1.35 4.17 
  Hispanic 2.03 5.21 
  Asian 1.35 2.08 
  Other 2.7 5.21 
Education Some technical, business school or college 12.16 29.17 
  Completed B.S., B.A. or College work 37.84 9.38 
  Some graduate work 7.43 10.42 
  Graduate degree (Ph.D.,M.S.,M.D.,J.D., etc) 39.19 48.96 
  High school graduate or equivalent 3.38 2.07 
Household income Less than $20,000 7.43 2.08 
  $20,000 to 34,000 9.46 10.42 
  $35,000 to 49,000 16.89 18.75 
  $50,000 to 74,000 25.68 30.21 
  $75,000-99,000 15.54 18.75 
  $100,000-124,000 14.19 7.29 
  $125,000- $149,000 5.41 7.29 
  Over $150,000 5.4 5.21 
Diet Score  Unhealthy (<=3) 70.95 NA 
  Healthy (>3) 29.05 NA 





  Less than two, including two 89.86 83.33 
Primary Shopper Yes 79.73 88.54 
  No 20.27 11.46 
Kids Yes 25.68 25 
  No 74.32 75 
Environmental Score (0-25) High Concern (<=15) NA 63.54 
  Low Concern (>15) NA 36.46 
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hydrates Protein Iron 
Calories 1               
Calories from 
Fat 0.51 1             
Total Fat 0.12 0.79 1           
Cholesterol 0.68 0.74 0.34 1         
Sodium 0.77 0.26 0.09 0.44 1       
Carbohydrates 0.91 0.12 -0.23 0.4 0.7 1     
Protein 0.35 0.14 -0.08 0.59 0.6 0.25 1   
Iron -0.09 -0.086 0.12 -0.64 -0.14 0.01 -0.7 1 
 
Table 3.12. Product ranking under Front label treatment (N=101) 
Front 
Best Worst Best-Worst Rank Product Name 
RRR 
Score 
345 -10 335 1  Horizon Organic Fat Free Milk 7.7 
289 -28 261 2  Silk Organic Unsweetened Soymilk 10 
274 -39 235 3  365 Fat Free Milk 8 
242 -43 199 4  Silk Unsweetened Soymilk 9.9 
119 -203 -84 5  Horizon Organic Whole Milk 4.5 
80 -140 -60 6  365 Organic Soymilk Chocolate 5.7 
42 -184 -142 7  O Organics Organic Reduced Fat Chocolate 5.9 
55 -262 -207 8  365 Whole Milk 4.5 
33 -242 -209 9  Silk Chocolate Soymilk 5.7 
36 -364 -328 10  Lucerne Reduced Fat Chocolate Milk 5.2 
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Table 3.13. Product ranking under Front and back label treatment (N=51) 
 
Front Back 
Best Worst Best-Worst Rank Product Name 
RRR 
Score 
175 -2 173 1  Silk Organic Unsweetened Soymilk 10 
157 -17 140 2  365 Fat Free Milk 8 
150 -12 138 3  Horizon Organic Fat Free Milk 7.7 
139 -12 127 4  Silk Unsweetened Soymilk 9.9 
52 -27 25 5  365 Organic Soymilk Chocolate 5.7 
33 -68 -35 6  Silk Chocolate Soymilk 5.7 
21 -106 -85 7  365 Whole Milk 4.5 
21 -129 -108 8  Horizon Organic Whole Milk 4.5 
12 -141 -129 9  O Organics Organic Reduced Fat Chocolate 5.9 
















                     Table 3.14. Product ranking under Front and RRR label treatment (N=47) 
 
Front RRR 
Best Worst Best-Worst Rank Product Name 
RRR 
Score 
178 -4 174 1  Silk Organic Unsweetened Soymilk 10 
160 -12 148 2  Silk Unsweetened Soymilk 9.9 
136 -5 131 3  365 Fat Free Milk 8 
128 -3 125 4  Horizon Organic Fat Free Milk 7.7 
36 -54 -18 5  365 Organic Soymilk Chocolate 5.7 
11 -63 -52 6  O Organics Organic Reduced Fat Chocolate 5.9 
19 -92 -73 7  Silk Chocolate Soymilk 5.7 
18 -143 -125 8  Horizon Organic Whole Milk 4.5 
11 -165 -154 9  365 Whole Milk 4.5 














           Table 3.15. Product ranking under Front, Back and RRR label treatment (N=97) 
Front RRR Back 
Best Worst Best-Worst Rank Product Name 
RRR 
Score 
393 -10 383 1  Silk Organic Unsweetened Soymilk 10 
314 -5 309 2  365 Fat Free Milk 8 
308 -23 285 3  Silk Unsweetened Soymilk 9.9 
229 -10 219 4  Horizon Organic Fat Free Milk 7.7 
57 -89 -32 5  365 Organic Soymilk Chocolate 5.7 
47 -148 -101 6  Silk Chocolate Soymilk 5.7 
27 -183 -156 7  O Organics Organic Reduced Fat Chocolate 5.9 
23 -287 -264 8  365 Whole Milk 4.5 
44 -297 -253 9  Horizon Organic Whole Milk 4.5 
13 -400 -387 10  Lucerne Reduced Fat Chocolate Milk 5.2 
 
 
            Table 3.16. Reasons for ranking (multiple choices per person) 









of Label Other 
Front 22.16 36.60 11.86 NA 7.73 21.65 
FrontBack 13.98 49.46 8.60 NA 4.30 23.66 
FrontRRR 18.58 32.74 11.50 19.47 6.19 11.50 
FrontBackRRR 13.18 37.73 5.45 25.00 3.64 15.00 
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Table 3.17. Agreement in ranking within information treatments 
Treatment  Kendall's W P-value Sample Size 
Front 0.4154 0.000 101 
Front Back  0.6168 0.000 51 
Front Back RRR 0.6155 0.000 97 
Front RRR 0.6051 0.000 47 
Environment 0.2452 0.000 96 
 
 
Table 3.18. The effect of product attributes on ranking under different information 
treatments  
Model (1)  Front Front Back Front Back RRR Front RRR 
Whole 0.798*** 0.593*** 1.159*** 1.27*** 
  (0.085) (0.071) (0.080) (0.122) 
Organic -0.271*** -0.205*** -0.142*** -0.181*** 
  (0.031) (0.043) (0.024) (0.033) 
Chocolate 1.000*** 1.093*** 1.181*** 1.101*** 
  (0.053) (0.079) (0.043) (0.047) 
Soy -0.099*** -0.507*** -0.381*** -0.323*** 
  (0.070) (0.064) (0.053) (0.089) 
No. people 101 51 97 47 
No. Obs. 6060 3060 5820 2820 
Note: ***Significant at 1%, **5%, *1*; Robust SE in parentheses 
 
 
Table 3.19. The effect of back label nutrition attributes under different information 
treatments  
Model (3) Front Front Back Front Back RRR Front RRR 
Fat 0.07*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.099*** 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Carbs. 0.116*** 0.150*** 0.143*** 0.132*** 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) 
Protein -0.077*** -0.002 -0.048*** -0.092*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) 
Iron -0.023*** -0.030*** -0.055*** -0.077*** 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) 
No. people 101 51 97 47 
No. Obs. 6060 3060 5820 2820 
Note: ***Significant at 1%, **5%, *1*; Robust SE in parentheses 
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Table 3.20. The cumulative effect on ranking of all information available under 
different information treatments  
Model (4) Front Front Back Front Back RRR Front RRR 
Whole 0.798*** -0.023 -2.854 1.165*** 
  (0.085) (0.057) (4.698) (209) 
Organic -0.271*** -0.018 -0.115* -0.178 
  (0.031) (0.056) (0.064) (0.033) 
Choco 1.000*** -1.778*** -0.315 1.008*** 
  (0.053) (0.637) (3.039) (0.156) 
Soy -0.099*** -0.194 2.438 -0.288*** 































No. people 101 51 97 47 
No. Obs. 6060 3060 5820 2820 




Table 3.21. Correlation between binary product characteristics and nutritional 
attributes  
  Whole Organic Choco. Soy Fat Carbs Protein Iron 
Whole 1               
Organic 0.206 1             
Choco. -0.277 0.166 1           
Soy -0.275 0.166 0.284 1         
Total Fat 0.419 -0.262 -0.175 -0.330 1       
Carbs -0.047 0.174 0.891 -0.027 -0.229 1     
Protein 0.267 0.322 -0.117 -0.647 -0.075 0.245 1   





Table 3.22. Environmental product ranking 
 
Environment 
Best Worst Best-Worst Rank Product Name 
281 -31 250 1 
Organic Valley Reduced Fat Milk 
(Cardboard, Local) 
262 -72 190 2 365 Organic Soymilk (Cardboard) 
186 -119 67 3 
Robinson Dairy Reduced Fat Milk 
(Cardboard, Local) 
116 -62 54 4 O Organics Reduced Fat Milk (Cardboard) 
182 -135 47 5 Silk Original Soymilk (Cardboard) 
149 -126 23 6 
Organic Valley Reduced Fat Milk (Plastic, 
Local) 
130 -157 -27 7 
Farmer’s All Natural Reduced Fat Milk 
(Plastic, Local) 
71 -209 -138 8 Horizon Organic Reduced Fat Milk (Plastic) 
44 -191 -147 9 Lucerne Reduced Fat Milk (Cardboard) 




Table 3.23. The effect of product cues on environmental ranking 
 











  (0.121) 
No. people 96 
No. Obs. 5760 










Table 3.24. The effect of environmental product cues on ranking with varying 
degrees of environmental concern 
 
Environmental Concern Score (0-25) 
  Less (>15) More (<=15) 
Organic -0.239*** -0.367*** 
 
(0.084) (0.049) 
Cardboard -0.375*** -0.399*** 
 
(0.122) (0.133) 
Local (CO Proud) -0.576*** -0.574*** 
 
(0.069) (0.066) 
Soy -0.870*** -0.964*** 
  (0.199) (0.154) 
No. people 35 61 
No. Obs. 2100 3660 
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Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives and Consumer Preferences  




Since the early 1990s, companies have been under increased pressure to develop 
more sustainable business practices and become active partners in the community (Mohr 
et al., 2001). Increased pressure from consumers, employees, media, and various groups, 
but also a desire to innovate and differentiate own products in the marketplace have been 
some of the drivers of this development. Specific involvement actions in social and 
environmental issues are usually defined by companies in their Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR henceforth) reports. Mohr, et al (2001) define CSR as “a company’s 
commitment to minimizing or eliminating any harmful effects and maximizing its long-
run beneficial impact on society”.  
The potential for environmental externalities and the rising consumer awareness 
of animal welfare issues in livestock operations (Lusk et al., 2011) make the dairy 
industry a particularly relevant testing ground for CSR-based product differentiation 
strategies. By committing to specific CSR goals firms may improve animal welfare as 
well as mitigate potential harmful effects to air quality (by reducing methane and/or other 
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emissions), soil (via appropriate grazing and waste management practices), and water (by 
monitoring waste runoff) (Center for US Dairy, 2010, EPA, 2007). According to industry 
sources, large distributors such as Costco and WalMart (Martinez and Kaufman, 2008) 
have been a major driver of CSR implementation in the dairy supply chain in an effort to 
reduce the risk of media scandals or other negative publicity. CSR efforts may also be 
driven by a desire to counter the negative stereotype implying that large, profit-driven 
companies have little interest in the well-being of their employees and society in general.  
CSR activities can serve both environment stewardship missions, but also as a 
tool to enhance firm reputations and create a loyal base of consumers (Pirsch et al., 
2012), attract a quality workforce (Greening, 2011), or differentiate own products from 
competitors and charge a price premium.  In other words, CSR activities can be 
positioned at the intersection between the disinterested provision of public benefits and 
profit-maximizing firm behavior (Kitzmueller, 2010). Even though CSR activities are 
generally not expected to directly change product characteristics in a tangible way, the 
portfolio of CSR activities may influence consumers’ perceptions about the product sold 
by a firm. As one example, Harper (2002) finds that animal welfare is one of the main 
reasons for buying organic food, and consumers may associate animal well-being with 
food quality outcomes. It is not yet clear to what extent consumers are motivated by 
concern for the animal or concern about the impact of the animal’s quality of life on the 
food product. While demand for CSR actions has been increasing, there is limited 




This study investigates the ability of CSR to serve as a profit-maximizing tool in 
the context of product differentiation. The principal objectives of this study are: I) to 
assess consumer preferences and priorities for specific CSR initiatives in dairy 
operations, II) to examine if and how existing, commonly used milk labels convey 
information related to CSR activities, and III) determine whether willingness to pay 





The popularity of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has increased in the past 
20 years due to pressures from both the supply (firms and retailers, equity shareholders) 
and demand side (consumer advocate groups, media and stakeholders).  
 From a theoretical economics perspective, CSR entails internalizing negative 
externalities on the society and the environment, or, the provision (reduction) of a good 
(bad). Even though it is provided by private firms, CSR has the characteristics of a public 
good (Hartmann, 2011). The public goods aspect of CSR has been criticized by 
neoclassical economists as being outside the responsibilities of a profit-maximizing firm, 
and under the jurisdiction of law-enforcing governments (Kitzmueller, 2010; Benabou 
and Tirole, 2010). Indeed, neoclassical economics defines the responsibility of a firm 
only as the increase in owner’s welfare and pursuit of a profit-maximizing strategy (Hart, 
1989; Friedman, 1970). However, some economists believe that CSR may not be 
incompatible with firm profit-maximizing behavior. “Profit-maximizing CSR” behavior 
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is defined by firm actions that are socially responsible with the anticipation of driving 
benefits from these actions (Baron, 2001; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Bagnoli and 
Watts, 2003). To this purpose, Baron (2001) coined the phrase “strategic CSR”, which 
blends private provision of public goods with firm profit-maximizing behavior.  CSR can 
be a part of the profit-maximizing strategy as long as company stakeholders (consumers, 
employees) have preferences that map directly into it (Kitzmueller, 2010). Kitzmueller 
(2010) creates a taxonomy of CSR based on shareholder and stakeholder preferences. 
This categorization is reproduced in Table 4.1. 
 
(See Table 4.1) 
 
The CSR classification identifies two types of preferences that consumers and 
producers can experience: classical preferences (relating to rational market agents that 
following profit-maximizing strategies), and social preferences (relating to a direct gain 
in utility from good deeds or indirect gain in utility from reputation earned in the eyes of 
society, Kitzmueller, 2012). In order for the “strategic CSR” to exist and generate a 
positive effects on profits, it is essential for consumers to display social preferences and 
be willing to pay more (or take a wage cut) for CSR. On the firm side, classical 
preferences will lead to CSR being part of the firm’s profit-maximizing strategy. Acting 
on these preferences generates utility for stakeholders and profits for the company. The 
utility derived from CSR can be either monetary, i.e., consumer reward of CSR firms 
through payment of higher product prices or employees accepting lower wages, or non-
monetary, i.e., social prestige, feeling good about firm’s actions. The literature integrates 
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both the monetary and non-monetary aspects as complementary parts of the total utility 
derived from having a CSR (Kitzmueller, 2010). 
Regardless of whether it is “strategic” or not, once in place, CSR may have 
several consequences for firms and consumers alike. 
On the producer side, CSR may prove useful in attracting a quality workforce 
(Greening, 2011). In the supply chain, it can play the role of insurance against scandals 
and negative media releases about firm business practices. Competitive trends related to 
brand positioning, marketing and innovation (Spar et al., 2003; Maignan et al., 2002) and 
increased pressure from the institutions of globalization, regulations, and sustainable 
development (Panapanaan, 2003) are added reasons for CSR adoption.  
On the consumer side, CSR may help create a loyal base of consumers (Pirsch et 
al., 2012) and positively contribute to the development of firm reputations. From a social 
welfare perspective, CSR is beneficial when it takes into account negative firm 
externalities on society and the environment and works on decreasing them. In a retail 
setting, provided that it aligns with consumer preferences for certain initiatives, CSR 
could be used as a purchase criterion. At parity other characteristics important to 
consumers, a product displaying a better CSR record may be purchased at a price 
premium if CSR-based product differentiation is feasible. This is especially true in the 
context of a shift in preferences and values, especially of the more affluent Western 
consumers, towards more environmentally and socially friendly products in the wake of 
more rapid spread of information through advancing communication technologies (Moon 
and Vogel, 2009; Benabou and Tirole, 2010). 
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However, while consumer popularity of CSR has been increasing, only a limited 
number of consumers use it as a purchase criterion. Out of the consumers who are likely 
to make a CSR-based purchase, only a minority (21%) actually use a company’s CSR 
position as a purchase criterion (Mohr et al., 2001). The wedge between consumer 
popularity of CSR and its use in product selection is currently minimally addressed in the 
literature. Some of the first attempts to explain it call it the paradox of CSR in consumer 
behavior (Öberseder et al., 2011).  
Interviews about how people incorporate CSR information in purchase decisions 
reveal three factors that predict consumer behavior with respect to CSR (core, central, 
and peripheral factors), Öberseder et al., 2011. Core decision-making factors include 
obtaining information about CSR initiatives and the presence of personal concern from 
consumers towards these initiatives. While the former lies mostly within company’s 
power, the latter is subjective, personal, and cannot be influenced by companies. The 
central factor is the price, or how much the consumer is able and willing to pay for the 
product based on company CSR initiatives. Peripheral factors include (1) the image of 
the company, (2) the credibility of CSR initiative (i.e., must be aligned with company’s 
core business and must have a credible channel of communication), and (3) the influence 
of peer groups (word-of-mouth about the reputation of the company).  
Based on these factors, the literature suggests that there exists a hierarchical 
purchase decision-making process involving CSR (Öberseder et al., 2011). Once the core 
factors are met (obtaining information about CSR initiatives and personal concern 
towards these initiatives), consumers can initiate the CSR-based purchase if the central 
factor (price) corresponds to their willingness to pay. Peripheral factors explain why 
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some consumers are still skeptical about purchasing even when the core and central 
factors are met. 
The core factors are essential in initiating the purchase decision-making process. 
While personal identification with CSR initiatives is subjective and cannot be influenced 
by companies, corporations can investigate what most of its customers are interested in 
and prioritize those CSR areas. In addition, identifying the best ways to convey CSR 
information to consumers is critical in initiating the purchase. 
In fact, research indicates that consumers rarely have access to CSR information 
in market situations (Hartmann et al., 2011). According to the theory exposed above, this 
is a major obstacle in allowing firms to use CSR as a marketing and product 
differentiation tool (Mohr et al., 2001; Du et al., 2010).  
Drawing on the literature outlined above, this study investigates the possibility of 
having a “strategic CSR” in the dairy industry in the context of product differentiation. 
The CSR-purchase core factors of (1) identifying consumer preferences for CSR 
activities and (2) obtaining information about CSR overlap perfectly with the first two 
objectives of this study.  
The first objective is to assess consumer preferences and priorities for specific 
CSR initiatives in dairy operations. The second goal is to examine if and how existing, 
commonly used milk labels convey information related to CSR activities. Alternatively, 
the third objective investigates product differentiation based on CSR. In particular, we 
wish to determine whether willingness to pay for fluid milk increases when specific CSR 




3. Survey Methodology 
 
A survey of milk consumers recruited amongst Colorado State University (CSU) 
was carried out in the summer of 2011. A total of 96 individuals were included in the 
study, based on a first-reply policy to an invitation e-mail which was sent to the entire 
administrative staff population at CSU. The invitation was not sent to CSU students and 
faculty. The survey was administered via computer in a controlled setting in a computer 
laboratory on CSU premises. Survey sessions included 20-25 participants each.  In 
addition to a section soliciting socio-demographic information, surveys consisted of three 
types of tasks, which directly relate to each one of the stated research objectives. 
 
I. Best-worst ranking 
In a best-worst exercise (Finn et al., 2006) participants ranked by perceived 
importance the involvement of a hypothetical dairy farm in nine alternative CSR 
activities: animal welfare, energy consumption, water consumption, air pollution, 
community involvement, employee opportunities, local operation, waste management, 
and sustainable agricultural practices. The description of each CSR activity provided to 
the participants is reproduced in Table 4.2. 
 




A balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) was used to create 12 choice sets of 
six CSR alternatives each
8
. Respondents were asked to choose the most important and the 
least important CSR area to them, as it is shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
(See Figure 4.3) 
 
Best-worst choice experiments became popular in the early ‘90s with a 
publication by Finn et al, (1992). Sometimes also called max-diff, the method extracts a 
final ranking of consumer preferences by repeatedly asking them to compare all the pairs 
of alternative CSR actions available in a set and choose the one which maximizes the 
utility difference between the best and the worst (Finn et al., 1992).  
The method has several advantages over traditional measures of measurement 
such as Likert scales. First, it forces people to make trade-offs by choosing a best and a 
worst alternative. On the other hand, on a scale system, all alternatives could be viewed 
as “best/ important” or “worst/ least important” (Lusk, 2009). Second, people interpret 
ordinal scales differently. When a person chooses a 5 from a scale of 1 to 5, this can 
actually represent a 4 for another respondent (Lusk, 2009). However, there is no bias in 
the best-worst scale as there is only one best-worst pair each consumer can choose 
(Cohen et al., 2002). Therefore, best-worst coefficients are directly comparable between 
people and result in individual as well as aggregate ranking scales. Third, despite the 
sometimes large number of choice sets and the repetitiveness of the exercise, participants 
                                                 
8
 In SAS, the %mktbsize and %mktbibd macros were used to generate a BIBD with 9 attributes, 6 attributes 
per choice set, and 6 overall appearances across choice sets 
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find the task easy and quick to complete (Goodman et al., 2005, Auger et al., 2004, 
Cohen et al., 2002). 
 
II. Label mapping  
Next, participants were asked to use a quantitative scale (from -5 “much worse” to 
+ 5 for “much better”, in increments of one) to express how fluid milk displaying a 
specific label certification (USDA Organic, RBST-free, Validus, and Local Colorado 
Proud) was perceived to perform in the nine selected CSR areas when compared to a 
similar fluid milk without the labeled certification. A description of each of the labels 
used in this study and is provided in Table 4.4. 
 
(See Table 4.4) 
 
The slider bar for this exercise covers the -5 to +5 range, and initially it is set at 
zero. By moving it left (performs worse), right (performs better), or leaving it at zero 
(performs the same), respondents indicate the degree they associate the milk label with 
each specific CSR area. The set-up of this type of question is shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
(See Figure 4.5) 
 
III. Valuation 
Finally, for each of the four mentioned labels, participants used a sliding bar tool 
(from -$2.00  to +$2.00 in increments of 10 cents) to express how much more or less they 
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would be willing to pay for a gallon of milk displaying the label (USDA Organic, RBST-
free, Validus, and Local Colorado Proud), compared to a gallon of milk without it. The 
exercise was then repeated, but, rather than their own valuation, participants were asked 
to estimate how much the general consumer population would be willing to pay for the 
label
9
. Examples of this type of question eliciting own and peer valuation are provided in 
Figure 4.6.  
 
(See Figure 4.6) 
 
 
4. Data Description and Survey Participants Characteristics 
 
The study sample statistics provided in Table 4.7 are comparable to state of 
Colorado demographics provided by the US Census Bureau (US Census Quick facts, 
2012). In terms of racial composition the statistics show: whites (non-Hispanic) 70% in 
Colorado, 83% in our sample, black 4% both samples, Asian 2.8% in Colorado and 2% in 
our sample, Hispanic 11.3% in Colorado and 5.2% in our sample. The median household 
income in the state of Colorado (years 2006-2010) is $56,456. This is comparable to our 
sample median of $50,000-75,000. 
 
(See Table 4.7) 
                                                 
9
 Research shows that individuals under scrutiny (in a research survey situation, for example) tend to over-
state their WTP on socially desirable issues (Fisher, 1993). If their own reported WTP is inflated perhaps 





Demographic data on gender, age, and race is presented in Figure 4.8. Most of the 
participants are female (74%). Since females are generally the primary shopped in the 
household, and the most represented gender in grocery stores, this may be the target 
demographic for milk consumption. 
 
(See Figure 4.8) 
 
The average age is 42 years old, with most of the sample falling into the 30-39 
years old bracket (34%), followed by the 50-59 age group (24% of the sample). 
Generally, respondents are white (83%), but other races are also represented: Hispanic 
(5%), Black (4%), Asian (2%), and others (5%, mostly Native-Americans and multi 
racial).  
Some of the household characteristics of our sample are presented in Figure 4.9. 
Most of our survey-takes are also primary household shoppers (88%), as we expect. 
 
(See Figure 4.9) 
 
  Generally, the sample is composed of families of two members (55%) or one 
member (28%). In terms of children who are generally frequent milk-consumers, 24% of 
the sample has one or more kids.  
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Education and household income statistics are presented in Figure 4.10. In terms 
of socio-economic characteristics, our sample may be slightly more educated than the 
nation’s average. Almost half of the sample (49%) has a graduate degree.  
 
(See Figure 4.10) 
 
Next, 29% of respondents have a college degree, while the rest have technical 
(9%), some graduate (10%), and high school (2%) studies. In terms of income, there is a 
wide variation with the lowest income under $20,000 and the highest one of over 
$150,000. Generally however, the highest percentage of respondents report a household 
income of about $50-74,000 (30%), followed by $35-49,000 (19%) and $75-99,000 
(19%).  
 Figure 4.11 presents the average willingness to pay (WTP) statistics for our 
sample. The average own WTP is consistently higher at a sample level and by label than 
the peer WTP. 
 
(See Figure 4.11) 
 
 The largest gap in valuation is for the Validus label (about $0.3), while the 
smaller is for Colorado Proud label (under $0.1). The Organic label commends the 
highest own average WTP, followed by Validus, RBST-free and Colorado Proud. In 
terms of average peer WTP, the Organic label is still associated with the highest average 
WTP, but it is followed by Colorado Proud, RBST-free, and finally, Validus.  
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5. Data Analysis 
The data analysis follows our three objectives closely. Related to the first 
objective, we use a best-worst (max-diff) exercise to rank of the nine CSR activities 
based on consumer preferences. If there is heterogeneity in consumer CSR ranking, 
segmenting consumers based on the similarity of their CSR preferences is the follow-up 
to this analysis. 
The best-worst data is analyzed using the counting method (Lusk et al, 2009). 
This implies that the final “score” of a particular alternative, j, is calculated as the 
difference between the amount of times it has been voted “best” and the amount of times 
it has been voted “worst” across all study participants: 
 
 
Where i=individual, j=CSR activity, n=1-12 choice sets 
When the results obtained in this fashion are sorted in decreasing order, the CSR 
activity with the highest “score” is ranked first and interpreted as being the overall most 
important to consumers, the next one is the second highest in importance, and so on.  
When ranking heterogeneity is high, groups of consumers displaying similar CSR 
preference may be identified. A principal component analysis (PCA) is applied to 
individual person ranking of each activity. Our goal is to extract the underlying patterns 
in people’s ranking preferences that make them behave similarly in the marketplace. 
These underlying principal components that capture behavior can be subsequently used to 
segment consumers with similar preferences. K-means clustering of these principal 
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components is used to identify these consumer clusters. The K-means method computes 
the distance of every individual from the mean of each cluster and assigns the participants 
to their nearest cluster (Wishart, 2001). While K-means clustering is criticized for 
problems with determining the appropriate distance measure and appropriate number of 
clusters (Green et al., 1967, Frank et al., 1968), anchoring it in principal components that 
are orthogonal and linearly uncorrelated can help improve the quality of this analysis.  
Next, the valuation data is examined. As a general framework of this analysis, 
Figure 4.12 illustrates that when consumer preferences for CSR activities map into 
consumer perceptions of milk labels as CSR information mediums, they may lead to 
consumer valuation of milk products. 
 
(See Figure 4.12) 
 
In the first regression model (1) we investigate if and how any of the CSR and 
non CSR factors included in our study influence consumer WTP for fluid milk. An OLS 
fixed-effects panel regression is applied to the pooled data of label valuations. The 
dependent variable in Model (1) is peer (rather than personal) WTP for each of the four 
labels in our study, and the regressors are consumers subjective perceptions of the label 
across the nine CSR dimensions in the study, plus four label-specific dummy variables 
(fixed effects). Model (1) is expected to capture the individual effects of CSR actions on 




(1)      
            Where i=individual, j=label 
 
Model (2) investigates the effect of CSR label perceptions on each label 
separately. Certain CSR activities might be relevant only to specific labels. Own and peer 
WTP measures are used as dependent variables one at a time. The independent variables 
consist of the CSR areas that display “spikes” in each of the label mappings (that is, other 
areas are omitted). These independent variables are mean-centered to indicate an average 
perception of the CSR activities. In this case, the constant term, α0, represents the 
contribution of all other non-CSR factors to the valuation of the label. We expect these 
contributions to own WTP to be generally higher than peer WTP, if social desirability 












CSR Priorities for Consumers 
Table 4.13 presents the overall ranking of the CSR activities obtained from the 
best-worst exercise. The overwhelming majority of participants stated that investment in 
improving Animal Welfare practices is the most important CSR activity. Next, 
sustainable agriculture practices showing the company’s commitment to maintain good 
soil health, ranks second. The third issue of high importance to consumers is energy 
consumption. According to our results, the least important activities are water 
management (somewhat surprisingly) and community involvement.  
 
(See Table 4.13) 
 
While the low popularity of some CSR activities is perhaps surprising, we find 
evidence of heterogeneous preferences amongst consumers. That is, a specific CSR 
activity may not be very important for the general population, but be extremely 
significant for a niche of consumers.  For example, “local” was voted most important 
practice in 100 times (third highest in terms of “best” votes) but its overall rank is 7
th
. 
Similarities in individual ranking patterns between consumers can be used to identify 
groups of consumers (segments) with similar priorities.  While areas unanimously ranked 
as “best” (animal welfare) and “worst” (community involvement) are not expected to 




 In order to identify consumer segments, we used a K-means clustering algorithm 
identifying similarities in the pattern of best-worst responses (more precisely, five 
principal component factor scores extracted from the data). This clustering approach 
simultaneously maximizes within-group similarity and cross-group differences in stated 
CSR priorities (Bond et al., 2008). CSR preferences within each group as well as group 
characteristics are provided in Table 4.14. Two specific consumer sub-groups emerge 
from the results: one emphasizes local business, equal opportunities for employees, and 
sustainable agricultural practices; while the other prioritizes air pollution, energy 
consumption, water quality, and waste management. The CSR preferences of the third 
group (Mixed) are quite similar to the ones we previously identified for the general 
population. 
 
(See Table 4.14) 
 
While all the nine investigated CSR activities entail desirable social and public 
welfare outcomes, the difference between the first two consumer segments seem to reside 
in the link between the proposed CSR activity and the nature of the resulting outcome.  
The first group of consumers prioritizes outcomes which the individual firm can 
accomplish independently (e.g. enforcing equal opportunities for their employees).  We 
label this cluster as the “local” group as the beneficiaries of these CSR activities are the 
local communities and employees of the company.  The second group prioritizes more 
“global” or collective outcomes: air and water quality, energy consumption, and proper 
waste management imply the concerted efforts of a large number of firms. The 
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beneficiaries of these CSR activities are not only the communities around the firm, but 
also the general world population and ecosystems.  
The local development consumer cluster has a high household income, the highest 
average own willingness to pay (WTP) for milk labels and 85.7% of them drink milk 
“Often”. However, this is a rather small segment (22%) of our sample. The Mixed group 
represents the bulk of our sample (60%) and despite their relatively smaller household 
income, their average own WTP for milk labels is second highest. They are also heavy 
milk drinkers (72.5% drink it “Often”). Plain milk consumption patterns of our sample 
are provided in Figure 4.15. 
 
(See Figure 4.15) 
 
Do Milk Labels Convey CSR Information? 
Product labels may be a vehicle for transmitting CSR involvement information in 
a grocery store setting where consumer purchase decisions are made. Figure 4.16 shows 
how perceived CSR outcomes (averaged across study participants) map into existing 
labels/certifications. A profile of the information carried by each label is thus created. 
Results suggest that the Organic label is positively associated with animal welfare, 
energy, sustainable agriculture, waste management, taste, nutrition. The RBST-free label 
strongly maps to taste, safety and nutrition, and mildly into animal welfare, energy and 
sustainable agriculture. The Colorado Proud labels is associated with reduced air 
pollution, community involvement, local business, and taste, while the Validus label 
transmits strong information cues about animal welfare, and minor signals regarding 
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employee opportunities, sustainable agriculture, waste management, taste, safety, and 
nutrition. 
 
(See Figure 4.16) 
 
Examining Figure 4.16, we note that milk labels can be categorized according to 
the dimensionality of the information carried. Multidimensional labels (e.g. Organic) 
communicate cues mapping into a wide spectrum of outcomes and may have the 
advantage of appealing to a large number of consumers having various preferences. 
Mono-dimensional labels (Colorado Proud, Validus) present a single major “spike” in 
one product attribute and may have the advantage of transmitting a single strong, clear 
message to consumers. 
 
Do CSR Claims contribute to label valuations? 
Two key pre-requisites have been identified for the occurrence of a CSR-based 
purchase: (1) whether consumers personally identify with the CSR activity portrayed; and 
(2) if they have access to information on that CSR activity at the moment of purchase 
(Öberseder et al., 2011). In the following results, we try to establish a link between 
consumer preference for CSR actions, consumer perceptions of these labels, and 
consumer valuation of existing milk labels as vehicles for transmitting CSR information 
in the store at the moment of purchase. Thus, the connection between consumer WTP and 
CSR actions is not direct, but rather disentangled from how consumer perceptions 
contribute to their valuation of these labels. 
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 Results from this model (1) presented in Table 4.17 show that the only CSR 
activity that is positive and statistically significant (at 1% level) is animal welfare. We 
estimate that, across the four labels, increasing animal welfare perceptions by one unit 
(on an importance scale of 1 to 5) contributes to WTP by an average of $0.07 per gallon 
of milk. CSR activities that do not influence WTP are either not valued by consumers, or 
are not sufficiently conveyed by the labels investigated in this study. 
 
(See Table 4.17) 
 
Estimates of the label-specific fixed effects are presented in Table 4.18. 
Controlling for the CSR contribution to valuation, all the other (non-CSR) contributions 
collect a WTP amounting to $0.45 per gallon for the Colorado Proud label, $0.44 per 
gallon for the Organic label, $0.32 per gallon for the RBST-free label, and $0.2 per 
gallon for the presence of the Validus label (all estimates are significant at the 1% level). 
The contribution of the CSR-related consumer perceptions to label valuation is presented 
in the last column of the table. The valuation attributable to CSR outcomes is largest for 
the Validus label ($0.26), followed by the Organic label ($0.20). If introduced in the 
market the Validus label has the potential, among the labels investigated, to collect the 
highest price premium due to CSR perceptions. 
 




Model (2) investigates each label separately. Results presented in Table 4.19 
show whether consumer label perceptions of CSR areas contribute to the valuation of that 
label. For example, a 1-unit increase (on a scale of 1-5) of animal welfare perceptions 
contributes to the valuation of the Validus label by $0.12/gal. A one-unit increase in 
perceptions of community involvement and water management associated with the 
Colorado Proud label contribute, respectively, $0.11/gallon and $0.08/gallon to the label 
valuation. For the Organic label, increase in perceptions of sustainable agricultural 
practices contributes to label valuation by $0.08, while water consumption perceptions 
can negatively impact this label.  
 
(See Table 4.19) 
 
 
7. Conclusions and Marketing Implications 
 
This study investigates three dimensions of consumer perceptions of CSR 
activities relevant to the dairy industry. First, we examine consumer preferences and 
priorities over a set of nine alternative CSR-related activities. Second, we assess if and 
how four milk labels may convey information related to CSR outcomes. Finally, we 
obtain consumer willingness to pay for each milk label, and explore whether, at least for 
some labels, a link between CSR activities and WTP can be established.  
Based on the results of the ranking exercise, animal welfare is clearly identified as 
the most preferred activity and a top priority for most consumers. This finding was 
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somewhat expected given increased consumer sensitivity towards livestock production 
practices, but the overwhelming consensus for prioritizing animal welfare initiatives is 
striking. Sustainable agricultural practices, energy consumption, and waste management 
are ranked as second, third, and fourth respectively; while company involvement in the 
community has the lowest priority amongst consumers. 
With the exception of animal welfare, rankings of CSR initiatives display some 
degree of heterogeneity across participants. Two differentiated groups of milk consumers 
can be identified using clustering techniques based on consumer preferences for local 
(employee opportunities, sustainable agricultural practices) vs. global (air or water 
pollution) CSR actions. A third group, containing the majority of our sample (60%) does 
not seem to make this distinction so discriminating among consumers solely on the basis 
of CSR preferences may not be particularly insightful. 
In the second part of the study, we mapped the perceptual profiles of four labels: 
USDA Organic, CO Proud, RBST-free and Validus (animal welfare).  The profiles 
disentangle the information content of each label by mapping them into perceived 
outcomes across several CSR dimensions, as well as taste, nutrition and food safety.  As 
one may expect, consumers associate the Validus certification primarily to improved 
animal welfare, but also to somewhat better nutrition, taste and food safety. Similarly, 
Colorado Proud sends a strong message related to locality and community involvement. 
USDA Organic and RBST-free convey a more complex message: Organic maps into 
sustainable agricultural practices (as expected), but also is aligned with better nutrition, 
taste, and animal welfare in the minds of consumers. Similarly, RBST-free is associated 
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with animal welfare, food safety, and sustainable agricultural practices among potential 
buyers. 
The distinction between single-dimension (Validus and Colorado Proud) and 
multidimensional (Organic and RBST) labels arising from the perceptual label profiles 
has relevant marketing implications. While multidimensional labels are able to convey a 
more elaborate and complex message, one-dimensional labels deliver a focused message 
and can elicit a “perceptual spike”. Thus, it is possible that multidimensional labels may 
be suitable for targeting a broader consumer population (with heterogeneous 
preferences), while one-dimensional ones may appeal to more specific consumer niches. 
While we find that consumers are willing to pay a premium for fluid milk 
carrying the Organic, RBST-free, Colorado Proud and Validus labels, the link between 
label valuation and CSR is generally weak, either because consumers are not willing to 
pay extra for such activities, or because CSR messages are not properly transmitted by 
the examined labels. The Validus certification is a clear exception: out of all the CSR 
activities considered, study participants attributed the highest priority to animal welfare, 
and the Validus label triggered an increase in product valuation because, as currently 
framed, it is aligned with animal welfare improvements. This suggests that product 
differentiation based on animal welfare may be a viable option for the dairy industry to 
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Table 4.2. CSR activities included in study 
Dairy CSR Activities Description 
Animal welfare 
There is a commitment to maintaining 
animal health through monitored nutrition 
and on-staff veterinarians, and reproduction 
by natural breeding rather than artificial 
insemination. Also, animals are kept 
outdoors rather than enclosed barns. 
Energy consumption 
 
Refers to the use of energy saving 
equipment in milk processing, and also to 
making transportation of milk to processing 
plants and retailers more energy efficient. 
Water consumption 
 
Implement recycling water programs 
through a water treatment facility and save 
water by using limited irrigation schedules 
to irrigate pastures and crops. 
Air pollution 
 
Manage the release of bovine methane by 
managed grazing and carbon soil 
sequestration. Also, decrease air pollution 
by making transportation from farm to plant 
and retailer more fuel efficient. 
Community involvement 
Company should be involved in charitable 
organizations, should implement 
volunteering days, and create and support 
local community programs. 
Employee opportunities 
 
The company should provide fair or above 
market wages, medical benefits, vacations, 
and retirement plans to employees. 
Employee advancement in company 
hierarchy is encouraged, as well as diversity 
in the workplace.  
Local operation 
The company uses local resources and 
generates local growth. The local economy 
is stimulated by creating jobs locally. 
Waste management 
 
Waste management refers mainly to 
composting solid waste to be used as 
fertilizer and monitoring waste runoff to the 
local water table. 
Sustainable agricultural practices 
 
Commitment to maintaining good soil 
health for a sustainable future of the 
business and the environment. Soil health 
implies practices such as the use crop 
rotation; using compost as natural organic 
fertilizer, and never using chemicals in 























Table 4.4. Labels included in survey and their descriptions 





Indicates that this product is produced 
using organic methods or made with 
organic ingredients. Certification is 
conducted by entities that have been 
approved by the US Department of 
Agriculture, using national standards that 





The Dairy Animal Welfare Review 
Program verifies a farmer’s animal welfare 
practices Specific areas reviewed include: 
Animal handling practices, Body 
condition, Feed and water access and 
quality, Herd health, Facilities/housing, 
Animal hygiene, Special needs 
management, Parlor management, Animal 





This label indicates that the product is 
produced locally in Colorado. 
No rbST 
 
This label indicates that the company does 







































Figure 4.6. Own and Peer valuation question example  
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Table 4.7. Sample Characteristics  
 
Characteristic % of Sample 
Gender Male 26.04 
  Female 73.96 
Race White, Non-Hispanic 83.33 
  Black, Non-Hispanic 4.17 
  Hispanic 5.21 
  Asian 2.08 
  Other 5.21 
Education Some technical, business school or college 9.38 
  Completed B.S., B.A. or College work 29.17 
  Some graduate work 10.42 
  Graduate degree (Ph.D.,M.S.,M.D.,J.D., etc) 48.96 
  High school graduate or equivalent 2.08 
Household income Less than $20,000 2.08 
  $20,000 to 34,000 10.42 
  $35,000 to 49,000 18.75 
  $50,000 to 74,000 30.21 
  $75,000-99,000 18.75 
  $100,000-124,000 7.29 
  $125,000- $149,000 7.29 



























































Table 4.13. Consumer ranking of CSR activities 
 
Attribute Best Worst Best-Worst Rank 
 
Animal Welfare 508 -10 498 (1) 
Sustainable Ag. Practices 215 -18 197 (2) 
Energy Consumption 62 -51 11 (3) 
Waste Management 61 -67 -6 (4) 
Employee Opportunities 68 -84 -16 (5) 
Air Pollution 27 -66 -39 (6) 
Local Company 100 -209 -109 (7) 
Water Management 19 -144 -125 (8) 





Table 4.14. CSR preference by cluster 
Cluster Local Development Global Impact Mixed 
(22% sample) (18% sample) (60% sample) 
Rank  1. Animal Welfare  1.Animal Welfare  1.Animal Welfare  
2.Local Business  
2. Sustainable Ag. 
Practices  












4. Air Pollution  
5.Energy 
Consumption  
5. Water Mgmt  
5. Employee 
Opportunities  
6.Water Management  6. Air Pollution  6. Waste Mgmt  
7.Air Pollution  
7. Employee 
Opportunities  
7. Local Business  







HH Income High Medium Low 
(24% over 100K, 
81% over 50K) 
(average 50k) (majority 55% 
under 49k) 
Age  Middle Aged Young &Old 
(extremes, 52% 





(59% under 39yr) 
Education  High and low 
(graduate, college 
67%, and the rest 














Milk Highest Lowest 2
nd
 highest 
Consumption  (85.7% drink it 
“Often”) 
(47% drink it 
“Often”) 




   
  













Table 4.17. Pooled label valuation model 
Peer WTP Estimate T-stat 
 
Air Pollution 0.026 0.98 
Animal Welfare 0.068*** 3.32 
Community Involvement 0.02 0.78 
Employee Opportunities -0.025 -0.1 
Energy Consumption -0.015 -0.57 
Local Business 0.005 0.21 
Sustainable Ag. Practices 0.009 0.44 
Waste Management 0.037 1.42 
Water Management -0.033 -1.13 
Taste 0.018 0.79 
Safety -0.013 -0.66 
Nutrition -0.007 -0.30 
Organic Label 0.444*** 6.22 
Validus Label 0.201** 2.6 
RBST Label 0.314*** 4.49 
CO Proud Label 0.453*** 5.15 
Obs 350   
Adj. R2 0.546   














CO Proud 0.55 0.45 0.10 
USDA Organic 0.64 0.44 0.20 
RBST-free 0.49 0.32 0.17 
Validus Animal 
Welfare 






Table 4.19. Valuation model by label 
















Constant 0.79*** 0.648*** 0.655*** 0.502*** 0.746*** 0.472*** 0.637*** 0.55*** 
Air Pollution   
 
    
 
  0.057 -0.028 
Animal Welfare 0.041 -0.012 0.023 0.072* 0.154*** 0.116***     
Community 
Involvement             0.141*** 0.112*** 
Employee 
Opportunities         -0.006 -0.006     
Energy Consumption 0.005 0.062 0.018 -0.017         
Local Business             0.045 0.029 
Sustainable Ag. 
Practices 0.042 0.084** 0.013 -0.027 -0.009 0.016     
Waste Management -0.044 -1.053** -0.024 0.034 -0.017 0.084**     
Water Management           
 
    
Taste 0.081* 0.04 -0.042 0.053 -0.043 -0.078 0.0394 0.028 
Safety     -0.002 -0.028 -0.037 0.007     
Nutrition     0.14*** 0.001 0.049 -0.008     
Obs. 92 92 89 88 90 89 92 90 
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This dissertation adds to the literature on information asymmetry in the food 
industry by assessing the role of various food labels as a means of conveying information 
about food product characteristics. Voluntary geographical indication certification, 
mandatory nutrition labeling, and potential environmental and ethical/sustainability 
labeling are investigated across three empirical essays. The unifying theme of these 
essays was how such label information affects purchase decisions, valuation and 
consumer perceptions.  But, the diversity in methods, and choice to move from the 
broader food sector (in the meta-analysis) to a specific product category that allows for 
analysis of more specific attributes (for dairy), provides an interesting comparative 
context on these labeling issues. 
First, we meta-analyzed the literature regarding GI valuation and we compiled a 
unique dataset to help us generate a set of guidelines, independent of any particular study, 
outlining the factors that are instrumental for a GI product to capture a price premium. 
One of the most important contributions of this meta-analysis to the knowledge in the 
field rests in defining industry and product characteristics of goods that derive the most 
benefit (measured in terms of price premium) from the association with GIs. Our findings 
across many studies indicate that agricultural produce and minimally processed foods 
such as grains, fresh meats, fruits and vegetables, benefit the most from association with 
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GIs. These product categories generally do not develop own private reputations (brands), 
and thus, the premium received from association with GI collective reputations is 
relatively high. On the other hand, in addition to GIs, products with high value-added and 
longer supply chains such as wines and olive oils may also use private brands for 
differentiation. As explained within the Shapiro (1983) and Menapace et al (2010) 
framework of multiple minimum quality certification schemes, the GI premium 
associated with already branded products is smaller than for un-branded products since 
some of the information symmetry is already resolved through those mechanisms. This 
suggests that brands and GIs have a substitute, albeit imperfect, relationship. 
Next, using original survey data, we learn that mandatory labeling of need-to-
know product information like nutrition provides consumers the knowledge to make 
informed nutrition decisions, but may suffer from an inadequate format in a food 
environment that encourages consumers to use more truncated search processes. 
Information on product characteristics lacking clear labeling such as environmental 
product impact information finds other, informal avenues (product cues), to reach 
consumers. However, the message conveyed in this manner is not clear or consistent.  
Truncated nutrition searches (looking only at the front label), or misleading product 
claims (such as “organic) are among a broad set of  reasons current labeling practices 
may be ineffective. We find that a nutrition index summarizing the information on the 
back nutrition panel, coupled with the information on the front label, helps mitigate the 
problems presented above. This may have implications for those agencies that oversee, 
update and evaluate the impacts this information has with consumers. 
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As a comparison to nutrition labeling, where there are fairly agreed upon 
standards about requirements and standards, we find that the environmental impact of 
food production, another credence attribute of food, is hard to identify by consumers, 
possibly due to the lack of proper certification. Analogous to nutrition labeling, we 
suggest future environmental labeling schemes will be most effective if  concise, easy to 
read and easily comparable across products, possibly in the form on an LCA index of 
environmental impact rather than  a list of attributes highlighting product impact on 
water, soil, air, etc.  
Finally, another important contribution of our original survey data, relevant to the 
CSR literature, is the identification of consumer preferences for CSR actions in the dairy 
industry. We are not aware of any other study examining CSR priorities for consumers in 
a best-worst survey format. Relevant to the dairy industry, we find animal welfare to be 
the most preferred CSR activity and a top priority for most consumers. Sustainable 
agricultural practices, energy consumption, and waste management are second, third, and 
fourth respectively in importance for consumers; while company involvement in the 
community has the lowest priority amongst consumers. Furthermore, we monetize the 
value of animal welfare claims, identified as the most important CSR activity by 
consumers, in the context of a trusted third-party certification such as the Validus animal 
welfare certification program. 
The radar diagrams mapping CSR activities in to common milk labels are another 
innovation of this study. Consumer perceptions of the CSR profiles of milk labels are 
represented here in a visual fashion that is easy to read and compare across labels.  And, 
the message that is conveyed from these graphics is that there are differences among 
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labels in terms of the expectations that consumers place on their relationship with various 
outcomes.  In short, there are varying levels of complexity surrounding consumer 
perceptions of labels, and this may influence how much they are willing to pay for these 
labels. 
The data set collected from our original survey (supporting the nutrition, 
environment, and CSR results) although small (a total of 244 consumers participated in 
the survey), is of high quality. The best-worst scaling methodology used in our original 
survey has been shown to have many advantages over traditional measures of 
measurement such as Likert scales. First, it forces people to make trade-offs by choosing 
a best and a worst alternative. Second, best-worst coefficients are directly comparable 
between people and result in individual as well as aggregate ranking scales because they 
present no measurement bias like the Likert scale coefficients (Cohen et al., 2002). Third, 
compared to simply ranking products directly, best-worst ranking is more accurate as it 
reduces the cognitive burden for participants and is able to discriminate between products 
that, at first glance, appear to be equally important. The data obtained in such a manner is 










Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 
Several limitations of this research also are worth mentioning. The GI meta-
analysis, while useful in identifying what drives the GI price premium, may suffer from 
some of the weaknesses attributed in the literature to the meta-analysis methodology 
itself. The most important one, in this case, may concern the data collected from existing 
GI valuation research. This dataset may not cover all the existing research on GI 
valuation, although an extensive search has been made to identify as many published GI 
studies as possible. In addition, the data may suffer from publication bias. Publication 
bias exists when published research is biased in favor of significant findings because 
insignificant findings are rarely published. As such, we may be missing a significant 
portion of the findings on GIs which may bias our results; however, the studies that are 
included have been analyzed in an appropriate manner and with a high attention to detail. 
 Another weakness of this study relates to how nutrition labeling and 
environmental impact are based on a conjoint-type design that helped us identify real 
milk products we included in this study. The choice of real milk products is both 
innovative in terms of offering realistic marketing implications, but also, a potential 
weakness of the study. In the literature, most conjoint and choice experiments use 
theoretical combinations of product attributes and attribute levels in order to distinguish 
the effect of each treatment individually on the choice consumers make. Nevertheless, 
these hypothetical product choices are artificially constructed and generally do not 
represent real alternatives consumers encounter in everyday life. At the expense of 
relaxing design characteristics, this research distinguishes itself by providing respondents 
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with real choices (products) they could encounter in a local grocery store on any given 
day. One advantage is that this approach mimics a real grocery store retail market setting 
where real milk products are evaluated by consumers and is more realistic in terms of 
actual product options people have on a daily basis. However, the disadvantage of this 
approach is that the wealth of other product information such as product packaging, 
branding, attractiveness of product design, or any other unique product features, available 
for real products may interfere with research findings. In other words, there may be a 
confounding effect between the conjoint product attributes we are interested in and any 
“extra” product information that may unintentionally play a role in consumer decisions. 
In terms of the CSR activities chapter, one weakness is related to the 
segmentation methodology used identify groups of consumers with similar CSR 
preferences. We use K-means clustering of underlying principal components that capture 
behavior to identify consumer clusters with similar CSR preferences. While this 
consumer clustering methodology is widely used in the literature, applying it to a small 
dataset of consumers (96 study participants) yields results that should be regarded as 
general guidelines, not exact findings. More recent consumer segmentation techniques, 
such as latent class analyses, can be used in future research to improve the accuracy of 
this analysis. While the limited data set is still a weakness even with latent class 
segmentation, this method has the advantage of statistically determining the probability 
of each consumer to belong in each cluster and identifying the optimal number of clusters 
within the model, while K-means clustering requires subjective user input to determine 
the number of consumer clusters. The limitations of this dissertation, as well as other 
noteworthy questions, should be addressed in future research on food labeling. 
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More specific future research avenues can be suggested for each of the labeling 
themes investigated in this dissertation. In terms of GI valuation, a number of 
opportunities for upcoming research are identified both from a consumer’s and 
producer’s perspective. As a hypothesis mentioned in the discussion of our results, 
consumers may be using a GI label to narrow the set of choices when searching for 
certain (branded) types of food. We envision using experimental methods to test this 
hypothesis, varying the labels across products and labeling options. This may even 
provide information to retailers who continue to fine-tune their sourcing and point-of-
purchase strategies in an effort to maintain market share among an increasingly diverse 
set of customers that seek attributes aligned to their specific preferences. In considering 
producer strategies and decisions, it would be interesting to explore what motivates or 
prevents a producer from using a GI available in their location, given that these 
designations seem to be an accessible way to differentiate their output and secure a 
premium. Another suggestion would be to formally evaluate GI use and branding in the 
context of alternative product and advertising strategies by individual producers or 
regional producer associations. 
Concerning nutrition labeling, knowing that consumers tend to use truncated 
nutrition searches to make food consumption decisions may have implications about the 
design of nutrition labels. Future research in this area should focus on statistically 
assessing consumer response to index-type nutrition indicators that can be added to the 
front label as an easy to read and compare nutrition information for food products. For 
example, the introduction of healthy eating indices such as the NuVal (taking values from 
1-100) in the King Soopers grocery store chain represents a unique opportunity to collect 
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the necessary data to test whether such nutrition indicators change consumer behavior. 
Working on developing a similar index measure denoting the environmental impact of a 
product is also an avenue for future research. Labeling of farm practices (e.g., organic) or 
other isolated food supply practices does not properly convey the environmental impact 
of food consumption. Ultimately, all forms of food production, transport, storage, and 
handling are environmentally disruptive and use of lifecycle analyses that focus on input 
use and output generation is a way to account for all these disruptive environmental 
effects. Future research should focus on providing a more agreed upon set of metrics and 
procedures to measure these environmental effects in a comparable fashion across 
products. 
In terms of CSR claims of food production, identifying consumer preferences for 
CSR activities in dairy is only the first step in determining whether CSR-based product 
differentiation is possible. We suggest that identifying the potential of product 
differentiation CSR activities is one of the priorities of economic research in this area. 
Future research should focus on ways of transmitting CSR information to consumers. 
How should CSR labels be designed and would they certify one CSR aspect or a bundle 
of actions? What certifiers are more appropriate depending on the type of CSR activity: 
independent third parties, firms, or the government? Are certain CSR activities (perhaps 
related to the environment, animal treatment, human treatment, etc) preferred and valued 
more by consumers?  
In conclusion, product labeling is a way to at least partially (e.g., nutrition) 
mitigate the information asymmetry surrounding experience and credence food attributes. 
Private, third-party, and government labeling schemes pursue similar objectives (e.g., 
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inform consumers, promote certain production practices, influence demand), but in 
different ways (Caswell, 2011). Unlike private and third-party initiatives which are 
generally focused only on their own role, the government also has responsibilities in 
regulating private and third-party labeling schemes, providing guidelines for private and 
third-party schemes, or monitoring these schemes.  
As an objective entity focusing on policies that serve the best interest of the 
public, the government not only administers its own portfolio of mandatory and voluntary 
labels, but also provides standards, guidelines, and monitoring for a variety of other 
labels and certification schemes. For “need-to-know” information labels, the government 
is instrumental in defining standards, administering, and monitoring the labeling process. 
For “want-to-know” labels, monitoring third-party certifications and perhaps defining the 
guidelines for these certifications may be a government role. Yet another role of the 
government in mitigating food information asymmetry is to direct resources towards 
areas of labeling research that are in need of further clarification (such as nutrition) and 
provide incentives for public as well as private entities to address these issues through 
research, scientific discovery, and human ingenuity. The present research is proof that 
existing, as well as future labeling schemes, may benefit from research associated with 
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